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DISSENT

THE NEGRO REVOLUTION

WHERE SHALL IT GO NOW?

An informal discussion with Bayard Rustin, Norman Hill and several editors of Dissent

RAYMOND WILLIAMS

PRELUDE TO ALIENATION

BEN B. SELIGMAN

THE AMERICAN CORPORATION

PETER DE LISSOVOY

FREEDOM WARS IN GEORGIA

PETER WILES

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING DJUGASHVILI

MAX SHACHTMAN

DEUTSCHER'S BIOGRAPHY OF TROTSKY

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A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

CONTENTS

Page

COMMENTS AND ISSUES

LAST CHANCE IN VIETNAM — *by Dissenter* 275

ARTICLES

THE NEGRO MOVEMENT: WHERE SHALL IT GO NOW? — *A Discussion* 279

FREEDOM WARS IN GEORGIA — *by Peter de Lissovoy* 296

PRELUDE TO ALIENATION—*by Raymond Williams* 303

THE AMERICAN CORPORATION: IDEOLOGY AND REALITY — *by Ben B. Seligman* 316

NOTEBOOK:

SNCC STRIKES THE LANDLORDS —*by Neil Kottler* 328

THE RICE SOLDIER — *by Louis Tursky* 332

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING DJUGASHVILI—*by Peter Wiles* 336

MOBILIZATION FOR YOUTH: PATCHWORK OR SOLUTION?—*by Robert Arnold* 347

ANNE PARSONS—*by Renee C. Fox and Rose Laub Coser* 355

BOOKS

PERSONAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS: DEUTSCHER'S BIOGRAPHY OF TROTSKY—*by Max Schachtman* 356

THE ISSUE BEFORE US—*by Susan Goodman* 364

SADNESS IN APPALACHIA — *by W. Carey McWilliams* 366

AS HE SAW IT—*by Martin Peretz* 368

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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL LOOKS AT THE VIETNAMESE CRISIS

THAUN DAO, South Vietnam — Long An province, just southwest of Saigon, is a potentially rich area. Its fertile land produces quantities of rice and fruit, and large numbers of the white Peking ducks so highly favored in Vietnamese cuisine are raised locally.

But prosperity hasn't touched most of the province's 300,000 inhabitants. Many live on small plots of rented land *and pay 50% to 75% of their crops to landlords.* Most do without electricity and running water.

A hired field hand earns 70 cents a day, if he can get work. Two young girls spend a long day weaving three fiber mats on a crude hand loom, dividing wages of only 50 cents between them. Vo Van Sang, a pork butcher here in Thaun Dao, one of 290 hamlets in Long An province, broke his leg 17 months ago and has yet to receive adequate medical care; the injured leg still bends freely at the break six inches below the knee and the muscles are shriveling.

Most American observers in South Vietnam say that if the U.S.-backed war against Communist insurgents is to make any progress, the Saigon regime must win the loyalty and confidence of the residents of Long An and the rest of the Vietnamese countryside. And the only way to achieve this goal, these Americans assert, is for the government to convince the 15 million citizens of South Vietnam that it can solve long-neglected social and economic problems and improve drab, substandard living conditions.

So far the government has made little headway toward this end. Vietnamese government bungling, graft and indifference over past decades have made the public skeptical of all administrations. Despite vigorous new programs aimed at countering this attitude, the regime of Gen. Nguyen Khanh—prime minister since the Jan. 30 coup—hasn't yet convinced many people that it is somehow different.

The government may not have much time. "If these programs don't show measurable progress this year," warns one American, "the whole war effort could be washed out from beneath us."—[Robert Keatley, *Wall Street Journal,* June 15, 1964. Emphasis added.]

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COMMENTS AND ISSUES

Last Chance in Vietnam

Half the art of politics consists in timing. Programs cease to be relevant after a certain point; they matter only if applied at the appropriate moment.

For years now both radical and even non-radical students of the Vietnamese situation have been saying that a precondition for defeating the Communist guerrillas was a government ready to apply seriously a democratic social program, one that would give land to the peasants and political and economic reforms to the cities. This might not guarantee victory; but its absence would insure defeat. Such a program was not applied, and the result is disaster.

The Diem government had the opportunity to make South Vietnam viable—and squandered it. Whether the present Khanh regime still has that opportunity is very much in doubt. There was a time when a democratic regime in Saigon might have defeated the Viet Cong guerrillas politically; but now, after years of wearisome civil war, the people may no longer respond to any political or social appeal. And only now, *a decade too late,* have the American "advisors" begun to realize that the war cannot be won by military means alone and probably not won militarily at all. The immediate debacle presents itself in military terms, but its root cause is political: a failure to understand the revolutionary currents sweeping through the "underdeveloped nations."

Six or seven years ago the guerrillas could be branded as agents of a foreign imperialism; today they are an enormously powerful social force in South Vietnam. Six or seven years ago they could be identified with the Ho Chi Minh regime in the North, from which nearly a million refugees had fled; today they appear as liberators of the peasant from burdensome rents and foreign intervention.

The war in Vietnam could not be won on the battlefields alone; it could be lost on the ricefields alone. The U.S. has spent $500 million on subsidies which failed to make our man in Saigon popular and on arms which the guerrillas who captured them put to skillful use. Part of that sum might have sufficed to start a sweeping land reform—buying out the absentee landowners and placing tools and credit in the hands of the peasants. Such a reform, in turn, might have overturned the power structure in the villages, thereby making democracy meaningful in a country that was supposed to be its Southeast Asian showpiece. The necessary political-social measures were not taken, in part because of an ingrained conservative obtuseness in Washington; and the U.S. therefore finds itself involved in an increasingly hopeless military entanglement.

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Even U.S. military men no longer say the war in South Vietnam can be won. The question now is how to minimize losses. It is possible, of course, to invest more military hardware, to send more "advisors," to stage periodic raids into the countryside—thereby maintaining the semblance of a Western-oriented regime which would deflect Communist aggressiveness from neighboring non-Communist countries for a while. But to do this and no more, is to continue making the people of South Vietnam into a sacrificial victim. And they have been that long enough.

The strategic concept of a drawn-out war of attrition makes sense only if one can foresee at the end of such a war either a diplomatic solution or a significant change in the enemy camp. Is that the case, however, with Vietnam? Some authorities, hoping to make it so, have toyed with the idea of attacking North Vietnam, or even China. An attack limited to North Vietnam is silly: it would not cripple the guerrillas in the South but would risk a larger war. An attack on China would be criminally irresponsible: it would make virtually certain a general war.

But if continuing the present policy means a hopeless attrition of the Vietnamese people, it must be stressed that simply for the U.S. to pull out of the country would mean something quite as inhumane. For it would then be a matter of months, at most, before the country was completely under Communist control and there would almost certainly follow a slaughter in the South of all those—*at least some of them, let it be stressed, genuine democrats*—who have fought against the Communists. To abandon these people now, after years of bitter civil war, would be an act of callousness.

This disaster is the result of political failures in U.S. policy over the past decade. Tomorrow, unless the lesson is learned, there will be new Vietnams and further disasters.

In some quarters it has been suggested that Vietnam, or the whole of former French Indochina, be "neutralized." The way to achieve this end, it is said, is to call an international conference and to make the future guarantors of Vietnamese independence precisely the powers that "neutralization" is supposed to eliminate from the area. "Neutralization" under the auspices of an international conference would thus mean that a coalition government ruling the whole of Vietnam, both North and South, would be formed. Based on an alliance between feeble Western-oriented and strong Chinese-oriented parties, it would surely lead in a short time either to internal crack-up and renewal of the civil war or, what is more likely, a full seizure of power by the Communists, who would then liquidate their opponents through methods by now all too familiar.

We should be candid with ourselves. The "neutralization" here envisaged is a formula for covering up a defeat. It may be necessary; perhaps there is no alternative; but to claim that it could be anything else is almost certainly a form of self-deception.

Is there still a possible way out? Five years ago, even two or three years ago, there would probably have been

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one. By now we cannot be sure. We cannot be sure that a point has not been reached where no program or leadership or strategy makes any difference. Still, it is a premise of serious politics that every situation be exhausted. We believe there is still one small possibility, and we propose it not in the mechanical spirit of liberal-radical ideology which tends much too simply to confuse the politics of reform with the realities of power.

In only one way could the South Vietnam government stem its increasing isolation and the mounting defeatism of its supporters. What little land reform has been put forward in the areas under its control remains partial, inadequate and undramatic. It does not free the peasant from the burden of paying rents to absentee landlords. (See the quote on page 274 from the *Wall Street Journal.*) It does not give him the sense of being his own master. It does not make him feel that Saigon speaks in his behalf.

Suppose, however, that in the immediate future the South Vietnam regime were to declare that all rents are totally and unconditionally ended; that henceforth the land belonged to the peasants who till it; that the agents of the absentee owners are deprived of their power; that the government will extend credit and aid to the new independent peasant proprietors. (An essential part of such a scheme would be to end the dodge used in those areas that have *some* land reform, the dodge whereby a landlord is allowed to retain 100 acres for himself and in practice keeps large estates through assigning land to the nominal ownership of close relatives.) Suppose, too, that the U.S. would help provide the funds necessary for such a radical program, both to finance the peasants and pay moderate indemnities to the landowners, thereby minimizing the disruptive effects of such a revolutionary change.

What would then happen? We are under no illusion that this would immediately dissolve the support of the Viet Cong guerrillas. It is probably too late for that. And we know that even in the areas still controlled by Saigon there would be plenty of skepticism among the peasants. With good reason, too. But if, when the time came for quarterly rent payments, the peasants saw that this burden had indeed been removed from their backs, that might indeed convince them that the government was an ally. It might then lessen their inclination to give secret support to the guerrillas. It might give their sons in the army a greater sense of morale, for they would then have something—their own plot of land—to fight for. And if in turn this program were related to a political ventilation in the cities, an opening up of free discussion and public life, there could follow a growth of participation in the effort to preserve Vietnamese integrity.

Five years ago such measures would have been enormously effective. Today the odds are heavily against their success. But if there is any way of staving off defeat, this is it.

Toward what end? Toward a "total victory" which would destroy the Viet Cong in the South? That seems most unlikely, and the price in blood enormous. No, the value of such drastic measures could reside in strengthening the capacity of South Vietnam to maintain itself as an independent

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national entity, and to persuade North Vietnam and the Viet Cong that a military struggle for "total victory" on their part is as unrealistic as the parallel expectation in the South.

What should then follow, instead of the linked chimeras of "victory" and "neutralization," is a political arrangement for the co-existence of South and North Vietnam. It would be necessary to approach Ho Chi Minh for a political deal. Neither Vietnamese state would try to conquer the other; they would restore their old and mutually beneficial economic relations, with the South supplying much-needed rice to the North and the North selling coal to the South at a better price than it can get elsewhere; and the Americans would pull out completely from the South, while Ho Chi Minh would disengage himself from Chinese vassalage.

Such a scheme rests of course on a number of assumptions which, in the nature of things, cannot be proven: that Ho Chi Minh would rather not continue a war that requires him to be dependent upon China and institute strict controls at home; that he and the other Northern Communist leaders retain something of the traditional Vietnamese distaste of China; and that the Viet Cong would agree to follow his political cues. Whether all this is true only time, bold politics and skillful diplomacy could tell.

While the essence of such a proposal would be an agreement for co-existence between South and North Vietnam, it would be crucially enabled by a U.S. promise to underwrite developmental aid for *both* countries as a way of easing their relations, helping the rehabilitation of war-torn areas, and making the arrangement so tempting to the Communists that they would choose not to press their military advantage. For this country, such a policy would constitute a radical departure. So far we have paid small-time dictators for permission to remain on their real estate; here we would be paying for a way to get off it. That the U.S. Congress would take kindly to such a proposition, is difficult to suppose. But if the alternatives are a humiliating defeat or an escalation into atomic war, the validity of this or a similar idea might yet be recognized.

As we said earlier: this is a desperate, last-ditch proposal, each part of which—first a radical land reform in the South and then a deal for co-existence between North and South—might well encounter severe difficulties. But at least it offers some perspective, and that is more than seems currently available in the offices directing American policy.

DISSENTER

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THE NEGRO MOVEMENT: WHERE SHALL IT GO NOW?

We print below a condensed transcript of a discussion held in May 1964 between a number of leading figures in the Civil Rights Movement and several editors of DISSENT. *Among the participants:* Bayard Rustin, *organizer of the March on Washington and perhaps the single outstanding leader to have appeared in the movement these past few years;* Norman Hill, *National Program Director of CORE;* Tom Kahn, *assistant to Rustin in the March on Washington and author of "Problems of the Negro Movement" in the Winter 1964* DISSENT; *Rochelle Horowitz, assistant to Rustin in the March on Washington; and Jack Rader, active in the Queens, N.Y. movement for quality integrated education. The other participants are* DISSENT *editors.*

Below are the questions that were submitted by Irving Howe to Bayard Rustin and the other guests at the discussion:

1) Would you care to speculate about the next stages of the equal rights movement? Several facts seem to converge to produce a salemate or near-stalemate: a) the "era of good feeling" between Negroes and liberal whites, which reached a climax at the March on Washington, seems to have come to an end, at least for the moment; b) the Negro campaigns in the South have in a number of crucial instances run into a stone wall of opposition, effectively maintaining the Jim Crow structure; c) the pattern of repeated demonstrations, often without precise objectives, leads to exhaustion, demoralization, loss of interest when there are no visible results; d) it becomes more and more apparent that the demand for Negro rights is deeply related to problems of the economic structure, a point we socialists have been emphasizing but which doesn't allow of easy solutions. Now, add to these facts that support for the Negroes in the white community seems to be decreasing, and that the passage of the Civil Rights Bill will not greatly affect the life of the ordinary Negro living in a Northern city—and you have a genuine dilemma. What, then, do you think the future prospects for, and tactics of, the

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equal rights movement should now be?

2) You have stressed, and we all here surely agree with you, that the Negro movement needs tremendously to gain and hold allies in the labor movement. Yet my general impression is that the unions have not responded to this crisis with the urgency we would wish. What do you say to your friends and/or critics in the Negro movement who say: "All right, an alliance wtih the unions would be fine, but how we can have an alliance with organizations that have little interest in forming one, and whose membership is corrupted by prejudice?"

3) There seems to be a genuine crisis of leadership in the Negro movement. It has been obvious all along that there hasn't been a single movement, but rather a loose alliance of parallel and sometimes competing groups. How does this alliance stand now? And something else: I have the impression that there is arising a new kind of Negro militant, in almost all the active organizations. He is fed up with white promises. He has discovered that he is *proud* to be alienated from white society. He has strong "nationalist" inclinations, vague though these may seem. But above all, he is desperate—impatient with the tactics of gradualism, nonviolence, etcetera. In effect, he decides to "go it alone," scornful of the white liberal and labor groups and of those Negro leaders who prefer to work with such groups. He has, it would seem, little faith in the possibility of changing American society, and consequently he is determined to shock and assault it. In a way, though he shows no inclination toward practicing individual terrorism or anything of that sort, he acts out of motives somewhat like those of the late 19th century Russian terrorists, who tried to substitute their intransigent will for the slowness and sluggishness of history. Is there anything to this description?

4) Finally, I want to ask you about the internal condition of the Negro communities, especially up North. It becomes clear that the struggle for equality will not be won very quickly; it will be a long and hard fight. That means having a community that is ready for a sustained struggle. But many of the activists seem, on the contrary, oriented toward short-run action to the exclusion of virtually everything else. And within the Negro community there seems also to be a very serious process of social disintegration, shown through many symptoms of pathology and demoralized behavior. Doesn't this raise, then, for the Negro movement and leaders the problem of trying to effect an internal self-mobilization in the Negro community, not merely for struggle on the outside but for social, cultural and morale purposes within its own ranks? I know that the comparison between the present-day Negro community and the Jewish community of thirty or forty years ago can easily become a facile one, especially if it is used too easily as a way of criticizing the Negroes. Yet, making all due allowance for the ways in which the Jews, even at their most exploited, were in a more favorable position than the Negroes, isn't there something to be learned from the way in which the Jewish world, especially the Jewish labor world, built up a highly complex and rich association of schools, societies, movements, etc., all of which helped sustain morale and provide vision even when objectives could not yet be realized?

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BAYARD RUSTIN: A number of the circumstances you pose in the questions are definitely there, but I think the important point is that the civil rights movement, because of its limited success, is now confronted with the problem that major Negro demands cannot be met within the context of the civil rights struggle. The frustration in the Negro community is not merely the result of difficulties in the struggle, but also of the fact that these demands are made in a context where the *Negro alone* is in motion. So that the major problem before us is how to relieve the Negro of this isolation. If there were a democratic left in this country, the Negro movement would be in it along with labor, liberals and intellectuals and people from the churches.

But now the Negroes have to deal not only with discrimination but also the problems of the whole society. While many Negroes would not so analyze it, they know in a visceral way that this is true. They know there is really no way to get jobs for Negroes unless something else happens. And they also know, and I know, that the labor movement, affected by automation, is itself unable to provide jobs for the people already enrolled in the unions, that the only way labor can handle this thing is if it allies with the Negro in a bigger struggle in which it can then afford to be an ally because its problems are simultaneously being met. Without this over-all political program, the Negro and the labor forces are antagonistic and will remain so. The unions will give money and pass resolutions but they will not act. That, I think, is the problem —not Galamison, not PAT, not Malcolm X—none of the things mentioned as being crucial are really crucial unless *this* is made crucial first.

NORMAN HILL: A related problem is that the usual tactic of direct action which here and there has produced an integrated lunch counter does not seem to be answering the demands of larger numbers of Negro people. The civil rights movement has therefore been forced to dig deeper, just to hold its own as an established part of the Negro community. In its very thrust, this movement poses questions that get at the basic problems of society. It is faced with a situation where, like it or not, it inevitably is driven toward making serious judgments upon society.

EMANUEL GELTMAN: I think Rustin and Hill are right so far as the long haul is concerned, but before you get there, you must face some problems right now. When Bayard speaks of the importance of integrating the civil rights movement with a revitalization of the trade union movement that for us is a familiar context and we, so to speak, know what to do about it. But before we get to the trade union problems, we must come to grips with PAT. I think it's almost easier for

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us to deal with the broader social problems raised by Bayard than to provide answers to local ones. After listening to a television broadcast where these PAT people were talking, I felt that I could not contain my impatience or even discuss with them. Yet that's the level that willy-nilly we're compelled to deal with now.

JACK RADER: In the school integration struggle in Queens, one of the things that strikes me about the reaction of the whites is that they act as if the question were one of special privilege for Negroes. There is tremendous irritation and misunderstanding. The postwar period saw the rise of new middle-class elements, typified by the white suburbs. These people who have recently arrived at this middle-class status feel threatened in a personal and direct sense. "My kid, what kind of education is he going to get?" They say, "I was brought up in a ghetto"—an ethnic ghetto, or a slum. "I made it, and I didn't go on any protest. Now, what the devil do these people want?" It seems to me that this threatens the possibility of a labor-Negro alliance. You have a tremendous privatization of life in this country, and the Negro movement arises when there are no other movements to coalesce with.

IRVING HOWE: Let's see if I can focus what's been said so far: In principle we're all for a Negro alliance with the labor movement, but that idea is too general, and doesn't provide guidance for what has to be done tomorrow in Queens or the next day in Birmingham or the third day in Chester, Pennsylvania.

RUSTIN: When I talked about an alliance, I did not mention the labor movement as such. I'm talking about trade-union people. I certainly do not look for any alliance which would include the AFL-CIO per se. Secondly, I think we have to think about what I call a political movement, not as a movement of the thirties or even the sixties, or anything else we've been through, but something new. To me it is programmatic-political; that is to say, I think now, today, around questions like total employment, limited planning, work training within planning, and a public-works program. There are many elements in labor, in the Negro community, and among liberals who can move on such a programmatic base.

I am not concerned fundamentally with the level of argument which has to be made with PAT. If we concentrate on that level, we are lost. PAT and the people it represents "have" to be anti-Negro as long as we are in the objective situation of declining schools. We have got to lift the school problem from integration to that of quality schools, which has to include, we say, integration secondarily. You must make a totally new approach, and it is only then that people can be brought into a

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broader movement. It is the broader social movement which educates them, while the civil rights movement keeps things stirred up.

HOWE: The question that must then be posed is: What *meanwhile* happens with the Negro movement, when it has to survive in relative isolation, under increasingly difficult conditions?

MICHAEL HARRINGTON: Well, I'll take off from that question and say that the Negro movement will simply lose; there is no happy answer if you posit it that way. This discussion points up that we're not talking about the Negro question, we're talking about the American question. If the American labor movement continues to take the John L. Lewis approach to automation, that is, to bid farewell to the workers who are kicked out, to re-form their organizations on a narrow but highly-skilled, fairly well-paid base, to accept a smaller role in this society but to keep their structure intact on that base, then you can say that instead of an alliance there will probably be a war between white and black at the bottom of American society. Second, if the American labor movement does that, not only will there be a war between white and black at the bottom of society, but neither the American labor movement nor any force for social change will be able to answer *any* of the questions, the automation question, the school question, the hospital question, the whole shooting match. But I think the trade-union movement, out of its self-interest more than concern for the Negro, will be forced to start doing some things that will move it into a position of alliance with the Negroes.

The idea we've discussed around DISSENT, and which is now being discussed at the UAW, of the trade union movement organizing the working poor both as a means of expanding its membership and of reaching Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans and other minority workers, is one proposal. Here I agree with Bayard, that in a context of full employment, or in the context of the type of proposal just suggested by Senator Clark's committee in Washington, of a five billion dollar additional annual social expenditure for construction, that even the building-trades unions, if they were enabled to double their available jobs and membership, wouldn't care if fifty per cent of that increased membership were Negro, as long as they paid their dues and didn't unduly upset the hierarchy. The possibility for successful action is dependent on these big questions. The answer to what we do meanwhile in the specific situations is—improvise, probably unsuccessfully, so long as so many of the massive determinants are loaded against us.

TOM KAHN: The Negro movement arose at a "wrong" time, when there are no supporting mass movements in the society. But to conclude

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that the Negroes have to face all issues on their own is to accept all kinds of things which the movement cannot accept. First of all, it means to accept defeat. Now there *is* a certain romantic strain in the Negro movement that's almost willing to do that. A segment of the Negro leadership and perhaps among the rank-and-file seems almost to want the movement to have a tragic ending which would somehow illuminate the human condition in all of its frailty. But the consequences of failure of the Negro movement would really be catastrophic. If you take automation and technological change into account, and if the rate of Negro displacement through automation continues, you get a picture of a class-color society. This will provide the basis for all kinds of extremely reactionary political developments. If that prospect is kept before us, and it's not a matter of hundreds of years, but in the decades ahead, I would maintain that the labor movement even in its present state represents a certain social ballast against such a development.

RUSTIN: Because we have gone so far but haven't come to the final step, we end up with the fact that we find ourselves without sufficient allies, and the Negroes are turning to tactics which are not commensurate with what they're trying to achieve. This is what always happens when a group attempts to achieve more than it has the power to. PAT would not exist if other elements were in the movement, and if it did we wouldn't care, because then it would be of no consequence.

HOWE: In other words, PAT and certain kinds of "extremism" in the Negro movement are both evidence of the absence of a vital major participation by the liberal-labor white world. They form symmetrical phenomena.

RADER: Both Bayard and Mike propose massive public works. But massive public works, government engineered and lopped off the defense budget, is a *substitute* for economic integration. It might succeed in admitting a given number into the building trades, but it will not succeed in allowing the Negroes to break through the normal pattern of employment in this country.

What we come to is that a whole new approach to social priorities is needed. What shall the wealth of the country be used for and how shall work be directed? Posed in these larger social terms of social priorities and the expenditures of the wealth and the energies of the country, I don't think you have anything on the horizon at this point which is concerned with this type of question.

RUSTIN: We're talking about our lives. If the labor movement is concerned now about full employment, it is concerned about public works. So are a lot of liberals. So are church people. Therefore you start

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with that point. Down the road they will see the logic of what you are saying. But let us start where we're talking about our lives, where our lives can in fact move. On the question of Negro strategy for now, I think we have not to be so pessimistic. In my mind, there have been many more successes of the civil rights movement prodding the society in the direction I want to see it go, than there have been successes in the civil rights movement *per se*. The churches are moving around the civil rights bill as no church groups have ever moved in this country and they cannot stop at civil rights, but must go beyond to the question of full employment.

Number two: There would not be any war against poverty had it been left to white workers. The Negro workers moved out of a sense of Negro dignity, and they stimulated Mike's book, they stimulated Johnson's program, which was in part stimulated by Mike's book, etcetera. It has an accumulative effect.

Three: We go rid of McCarthyism on the American campus in 1960 because Negro students moved in the sit-ins. Whites were touched and some of them had to move also. This made political discussion possible on the campus.

Now concluding: I think that the civil rights movement has two fundamental strategies to follow: First, stay in the streets, winning little victories, and sometimes none, but stay, for the very reason that you stimulate other segments of the society, limitedly, to move. Second, the civil rights movement now has an obligation to carry the questions which I discussed earlier under full employment, planning, training, and so forth. They must now begin to carry that message into the streets. When they go to sit down in front of the building trades, or to climb a crane, they have to say, "We are doing this as a symbol of the fact that we want jobs. We want ten jobs *now* in the building trades. And further, we insist that America hear and act on this program for dealing with our real problem." I think the civil rights movement is just about ready to move in that direction.

HARRINGTON: I agree with what Bayard said. But to go back to something that Jack Rader said, not so much in contradiction, but, I think, an extension. When Jack said that this public-works plan Bayard has been talking about would not allow the Negro to break through to the normal employment pattern, that's true. The reason is that the normal employment pattern in the United States is partly being revolutionized out of existence by technology. Nobody's breaking through to the normal employment pattern—not just Negroes, but whites and Negroes, which again points up how radical the American problem is.

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HOWE: And to interrupt you, Mike, public works may itself become a normal work pattern.

HARRINGTON: Right. But let me go on to just a couple of statistics I came upon recently which indicate how extraordinary the situation is. According to the House Labor Committee which investigated the functioning of the Manpower Development and Training Act, fifty-seven per cent of the Negroes twenty-four years of age in the United States were school dropouts. According to the Secretary of Labor, you need a high school education to really function in this economy. Therefore, presently, fifty-seven per cent of the Negroes in the United States cannot hope to break through to a normal employment pattern. At the same time, the Committee pointed out that about twenty-eight per cent of the whites at the same age are dropouts. This means between a quarter and a third of all youth are unfit for present technology.

In a sense the Negro alone has been facing the entire American question and that's what a lot of the problem stems from. But we can't be too pessimistic, because someday American society is going to have to face the American question, and when it does it can't help but ally itself with the Negroes.

STANLEY PLASTRIK: Unfolding right before our eyes now is a beautiful illustration of what Bayard and others here have been talking about; that is, the way in which the so-called Negro question is really the question of the entire future of American society. Until a few weeks ago the concept of the educational park was largely unknown. Now the Board of Education has put it on its agenda. It's posed before the entire population of New York City. I don't want to discuss the merits of it now, but obviously it transforms the whole discussion of education and integration. Or, to take another illustration: Some years ago, a few people—I remember Bruno Bettelheim, for example—raised the questions of the effects of a kind of *de facto* segregation within the schools, that is the homogeneous grouping of children. That discussion didn't get anywhere, but obviously the question must come up again.

RUSTIN: Neither of these things could possibly have burst into the picture had it not been for the movement of the Negro. And already the Negro struggle for quality education has forced the school board to do something which is of tremendous benefit to every child regardless of color, and that is dropping the so-called I.Q. tests.

GELTMAN: I find myself annoyed by the pessimism that frequently issues from the civil rights movement. A great deal of progress has been made which may ultimately be a lot more important than whether some particular person got into the sheet-metal workers union or not. Other

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civil rights leaders do not talk, at least publicly, the way Bayard does, not even the socialists, or the trade unionists like Randolph, or the educators like Kenneth Clark. Clark, for example, speaks in terms of quality education; it is *our* function to give it the broader context. If you tackle slums you find they are not just problems in housing. You have to tackle the slum as a problem in education, and in health. It is really our function as socialist intellectuals to portray the total picture.

And I seriously believe that the problem is not one of just working out some accommodation between the trade union movement and the civil rights movement. Even in terms of self-interest, the leadership cannot stick with the status quo.

HOWE: Let me inject a "pessimistic" note here, just for the sake of stirring up the discussion. It seems to me there's a terrible discrepancy between the general, programmatic, ideological level on which we all really agree and the immediate practical reality. In New York City you have the following situation: a white middle class which favors integration in Birmingham but faced with changes at home has really hardened. For the first time a large section of the Jewish middle class, traditionally liberal, is also hardening, and is simply holding out in behalf of its own narrow interests. And this middle-class reaction has shown itself to be more resourceful than the whole liberal-labor movement in New York City. On the other hand, as far as I know, neither the ILGWU, the main trade union in New York City, nor the NMU sent anyone to the conference on integrated, quality education which was organized by David Livingston and Reverend Donald Harrington. Not only have major unions not participated in this effort to weld a rough sort of alliance, but the intellectuals have also been disgracefully absent. Yes, it's essential to work out the broad programmatic conception. But in terms of concrete politics the immediate situation cannot be confronted only through that general program. Locally the situation is extremely tough and rather bad.

HOROWITZ: What makes the problem so difficult is that there are reasons for both optimism and for pessimism.

There is the Allen report. And Bayard's right about the churches. But the Negro in the street has not seen one gain, and you have to be an intellectual to see the larger perspective.

The March on Washington raised a whole series of demands in a way that was able to pull in the white community on the programmatic level that we're discussing now. It's interesting—

HOWE: Let me interrupt you, Rochelle. The March on Washington was general, it was humane, it was brotherly, but it didn't affect what

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happened in the white guy's job or neighborhood. Now suddenly it's come home, and it's hit him, and he's nervous.

HOROWITZ: You have to work out a broad programmatic base to involve the white community. It is possible to march to City Hall, for instance, for quality, integrated education and to get white people involved in this. It would have been possible for Galamison to have structured his demands, before the first school boycott, in a way that would have brought the white community along with it and not have terrified them.

There is a certain type of leadership which does thrive on defeat, a lazy, opportunistic leadership. They not only don't have a program, they are opposed to a program. This can be very demoralizing. Temporarily it results in publicity and an easy style of leadership. It's much easier to be a Milton Galamison than a Bayard Rustin.

HOWE: There are people in or near the Negro movement who say that Bayard's program is certain to fail, that it must fail, that the very nature of American society is such that the idea of a Negro-labor alliance is doomed to failure, that it puts too much trust in the white community. Consequently it seems to me that there must be forming a sentiment which is roughly equivalent, to make an historical analogy, to that of certain kinds of revolutionists in Russia in the late nineteenth century who turned to terrorism, not because they believed in terrorism in principle, but because they believed there were no longer any positive social forces which could act. Therefore they tried to substitute for a static history their own sacrifice and desire. The consequence of such terrorism almost always is to exhaust the best cadres, and to lead to isolation and defeat.

I suspect one of the feelings such people, the "desperadoes" in the Negro movement, have is that they may never have allies in America, but they do have allies in Cuba, China and in such places. And this is really a terrible illusion.

RUSTIN: I have a little anecdote which bears you out. Norman Hill and I were investigating the set-up at the World's Fair before we went out to have the sit-downs. I called a friend who works for the delegation of a new African nation and asked him if he could get one of the African countries to let us come in early with their officials to look over their pavilion. When I called the next day, he said, "Look, the boys are scared. The last thing they will do is to take you or any other Negro out there to see this fair. These boys are so economically dependent on the West that the only thing they will do is debate South Africa in the

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UN but they will never touch anything regarding the United States and its internal questions."

KAHN: There is some justification for the comparison with a nineteenth century Russian-terrorist type of psychology. On the positive side, there are changes in consciousness yet no changes in the basic situation. There is a movement for integrated schools in New York but no signs that major breakthroughs will be made. We talk about the ecumenical movement among the religious groups and the changes in consciousness that result. The liberal ideology spreads over the country but at the same time, underneath, certain regressive trends are going on that clash with it.

The economic situation means certain things for the Negro and unless a massive change takes place, it looks very bad. Demographic changes are crucial. A new consciousness about the New York school situation may arise, but it can make no difference as long as Negroes continue to make up a larger and larger proportion of central cities, while white people continue to move to the suburbs. Therefore, it is bad to have so much activity without visible results, because the democratic ethic may suffer from the disillusionment.

Two years ago I was saying that you have to have a sympathetic attitude toward the Negro extremist because he suffers a great deal of frustration. To an extent, that may still be true. But I am much stronger in my opposition to those elements now, simply out of the realization that it is a tremendous disservice to the masses of Negroes to lead them to expect that their needs can be articulated by a voice in isolation.

HILL: It seems to me that we're in for a very rough period. The leader who is likely to emerge in every local situation is the demagogic type rather than the type who is going to articulate anything of what Bayard says in his speeches. And not only because the Negro movement exists in the absence of any democratic left, but also because no matter how you put what we've been saying in this room it sounds to the average Negro like "Wait." Galamison can say, "Tie up the schools." Now we can't say it because we're too honest to pretend that that alone would achieve much. Still, we can say all kinds of other things which to the average Negro sound like, "This is for real." As long as his alienation persists and as long as we don't really build some kind of secondary cadre, then we will have to confront the emergence of the demagogic or "nationalist" leaders. The young Negro militants pay attention to them.

HARRINGTON: What Norman is talking about could, by way of his-

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torical analogy, be something akin to what took place among the coal miners in the 1920's when they waged a bitter struggle in isolation from the labor movement as a whole. I would only point out on the other side that eventually that struggle did pay off.

I think that the report of the Clark subcommittee calling for five billion dollars extra expenditures annually, the growing consciousness in this society that *something* has to be done, is already leading, not yet at the bottom of society but at the top, to the possibility of some changes which could help the civil rights movement.

HOWE: In all past major social and revolutionary movements there have been ups and downs, but the important difference here is that we're speaking about a minority movement, only ten per cent of the population. Given a society which is fundamentally cut off from that minority, large parts of which are hostile to it, and large parts of which are cosily affluent, we have a new prospect, namely, a minority becoming more and more desperate, but without the possibility of a major upsurge such as previous social movements have had.

RUSTIN: It's important to point out that one of the problems is that in the civil rights movement we have no literature, no history, no former revolutionary movement that has ever taken place in the context you have just described. Certainly, India where I have worked is not the same because even the untouchables do not have high visibility. The government of India from its very inception, largely because of Gandhi's spiritual approach to revolution, made a tremendous reconstruction effort in India. Gandhi's death did not cut it short as Lincoln's did here. Now I think we have to be very thankful that things have even gone as well as they have. Those who talk about the use of violence and so on, also have to face the fact that no minority is going to get away with guerrilla warfare in the United States. It's just impossible. Therefore we must realize that we are dealing with a situation which is far different from any we have ever been through.

KAHN: I have a question to put to Bayard. Numbers of young people in the movement seem to regard the stall-in and similar tactics as logical extensions of your theory of social dislocation. Where does your theory of social dislocation end and the stall-in tactics begin?

RUSTIN: I think it is, in a sense, a logical deduction. Many of them have come to me and said, "We thought we were doing exactly what you were proposing." I don't think that one can ever think of the theory of social dislocation in the abstract. One must always, when developing tactics, think of the exact situation one is in, the reaction one is going to get, and certain tactical problems. Now, I was opposed to the

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World's Fair stall-ins for a number of reasons. One, it is a tactic which can only be successful if it is secretive. Once the police know about it, they will do what they did. Second, they can get injunctions against the leadership, isolating them when they should be organizing the masses. Anytime you call upon two thousand people to do something, it could not possibly be secretive and therefore they stepped into the government's hands. And further, it was wrong, because it did not leave an adequate alternative. A tactic which just harumscarum ties up everybody is wrong. Not that in principle I'm against people being alienated. In social change there is always alienation. But if you're trying to win allies, you want to reduce that alienation to an irreducible minimum. Also the tactic was not good because it did not pinpoint the objectives that were to be achieved. No one could have said: "What can we give you to call off this project?" Therefore certain principles have to be applied if social dislocation is to be reasonable.

GELTMAN: Isn't that also true of the sit-in in which you took part?

RUSTIN: No, it was not. Several times I got up to let women and children pass through.

GELTMAN: No, I mean the specific objectives. Could they say, "We'll give you this, we'll give you that . . ."

RUSTIN: Oh yes. If the Mayor of New York City had said, "We will have round-the-clock discussions on the school integration problem. I'll call everyone to my office and tell them to stay there until this problem is settled," we would have left.

HOWE: Norman Hill says that the problem is the incongruity between the long-range political program that Bayard proposes and the difficulty of keeping the Negro movement going in a constructive way right now. Bayard, you ought to talk on this.

RUSTIN: I think we've got to have a political movement, in the sense that the civil rights movement is now a political movement. It's a matter of broadening that. Regardless of people's politics, regardless of what church they belong to, or union, thousands and millions of people are contributing to the civil rights organizations, are getting into the streets. They came to the March on Washington. This is the kind of movement I see as a political movement, around such things as full employment, some planning, training within that planning, a public works program. I think without setting up a political structure or a party we can carry this to the people and get the kind of enthusiasm that you now get around the civil rights bill, or that we got around the March on Washington.

But it has to be spelled out so people can understand it. Meany has

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already called for public works. Let's take him up on this, not damn him. Men like Ralph Helstein and Reuther are prepared to go even further. Let's get a simple program now around which we can organize. While people may be bound by certain political allegiances and the like, these things can be broken as the need is seen. Then you ask for a deeper program and you proceed in that way. I don't know what else there is except getting the Negroes to carry that program in their demonstrations and saying to them, "Continue to demonstrate. We now have not only an objective of getting a few jobs here but of spelling out a political program."

HOWE: Could you say something about the question: What is the present mood of the more important sections of the Negro leadership in regard to this program?

RUSTIN: I think the Negro leadership out of its own frustration is having to look in two directions. One, organizing the grass roots, getting down to some block organization in the ghetto; and, on the other hand, seeing the limitations of this method alone and thereby increasingly following the Randolph notion of seeing the problem as an American social problem. They will be forced into this, by the fact that they can't deliver what needs to be delivered by merely looking at the problem as a civil rights problem.

HOWE: Question four. Rustin should answer it.

RUSTIN: I agree with what is implied in the question. I don't think there's much of a comparison. Jews were an ingrown group themselves, with a very long history and culture, and this had an effect. They also could become invisible as many of them did. But on the major question I am one of those who has a very dim view of being able to patch up the ghetto. There is a ghetto psychology, and this cannot be eliminated. There is the filth of the ghetto; and the ghetto has its own logic. However, I am very much for mobilizing the community to deal with their immediate problems. If there are rats you help people get rid of them, and the same with roaches and triple-sessions. I am for approaching the problem on this level as a means of doing a basic educational job with these people.

GELTMAN: We're touching on a much broader problem than may be apparent. There has begun very serious consideration not merely for Negroes but for society as a whole, of various kinds of self-mobilization programs. You will see the idea put forward in connection with jobs. If you have so many young people who cannot find jobs, who are not trained, you can employ them in helping themselves. The whole proposal with respect to self-mobilization is going to get attention precisely

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in the terms in which you originally spoke, that is, of coping with general problems of society, from poverty to narcotics addiction, and anything we can do in this connection with respect to the Negro problem obviously is relevant. There is one point I want to throw in on the Jews and that is that what everyone forgets is that the Jews, in moving forward, had a very important and unique connection. Apart from their invisibility and so forth, their progress was largely tied on the economic front to the unions in New York, especially the ILGWU.

HOWE: Granted, the ghetto has a bad psychology of its own which can't be abolished without abolishing the ghetto itself. I accept that. Granted, too, that the analogy with the Jews has its obvious weakness. My point is this: Given the present situation, school dropouts in Negro communities and various kinds of social pathology, it is not sufficient to try to involve such young people in political and social struggles. Necessary, but not sufficient. One of the responsibilities of the Negro leadership is to work within its own world, morally, socially, educationally, psychologically, for purposes of sustaining morale, of inculcating values and vision. This kind of thing must be done, and here the comparison with the Jewish world makes some sense because the internal richness of its own community was one of the great sustaining factors of the immigrant Jewish world where there was poverty, alienation, unemployment and all the rest. Am I wrong?

HOROWITZ: There is a way in which a stereotype produces a certain kind of person, and you have to think about the stereotype of the Jew and of the Negro and the kind of pressure that the Negro community has been subjected to. Never have you heard about Jews being inhuman. That is, they were shrewd, businesslike, etcetera. For Negroes, to conform to their stereotype is to be . . .

HOWE: Why can't one of the objectives of the self-mobilization within the community be to break down these stereotypes?

HOROWITZ: That is what the sit-ins are about, right?

HOWE: Of course, the sit-ins are one way of realizing the objective at a time when you have to have a prolonged struggle, but it seems to me that there's a great need for internal education.

KAHN: There has been a great deal of self-help in the Negro community, and I bet there's been more intensive effort at this among Negroes than among Jews. The whole emphasis on self-help, on Negro solidarity and economic uplift, is accentuated in times of social discouragement. There is a whole Booker T. Washington tradition, that's self-help. Negro fraternities, mutual aid societies, etcetera.

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HOWE: But what I'm talking about is self-help toward the objectives of winning the revolution.

KAHN: You find that the fight for integration is pushed by the middle-class, "assimilationist" Negroes and not by the nationalist-oriented Negroes; and that contrasts with the Jewish community. The fight for integration did not come from those Negroes who felt that they had some cultural heritage to preserve. The self-help movement broke up on the shoals of the ghetto. I'm not so interested now in seeing a self-help movement among Negroes, because I know the form it's going to take. We want equality; I want Negroes to get *out* of the ghetto, not to be helped within it.

PLASTRIK: I can understand the fundamental objections on this self-help issue. It seems to conjure up images of small business operations and small capital accumulation, which of course is a very important part of the Jewish background.

A couple weeks ago, two French intellectuals from the *Esprit* group were here and they asked me to accompany them on a visit to Harlem. They had expected to see, as you do in Paris, a small Algerian quarter. They had absolutely no idea of what was there and when they saw the reality and extent of it, they were dumbfounded. And I realized at that point that if I talked to them in terms of the sort of thing we talk about, self-mobilization, they would have felt the utter inadequacy of that kind of response. They wanted to hear me say, as a representative of the left, something to the effect that this whole thing has to be smashed to smithereens.

When we talk about self-mobilization, I think perhaps what we have in mind is the struggle against the spiritual and psychological demoralization that one finds in Negro communities.

HOWE: Tom, I mean by self-help the kind of thing that your group has been doing with those young kids—educating them, trying to give them some perspective, so it isn't just a matter of demonstrations but some understanding to build their morale.

RUSTIN: But what you're talking about is that you get these people to realize the nature of life, of the economic system, what dope really means and why it should be overcome, what prostitution really is and why it must be rooted out. You can get this in one way and one way only, not by preaching and not by inculcation, because Negro mothers have always told them this; but in the struggle to destroy the ghetto.

GELTMAN: An illustration of the lack of conscious social aspirations was presented by the coal miners in West Virginia when they were earning $20 a day, and lived in the most miserable shacks, worse than many

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in the ghettos—because the union and the miners did not have the social aspiration that they should escape. Other workers have associated economic gains with social achievements.

HARRINGTON: There is practically no analogy between the Negro poor and any other poor there have ever been in the United States. There's a danger of looking for a repetition of the forms of the Jewish or other immigrant experiences in terms of the Negro movement. The form of self-help imposed upon the Negro, his past and present, is the civil rights movement itself.

HOWE: What you're saying, Mike, is very interesting. There is a whole aspect to the Negro movement that doesn't get into the papers, which consists of the sustaining educational and cultural work.

HOROWITZ: People in the East River Core will tell you that they have two alternatives. They can either be in the streets or in the movement, and to be in the movement means to be a man. But if you called it self-help, they would punch you.

HOWE: I'm talking about self-mobilization as part of the way in which leaders lead a movement.

HOROWITZ: But there are things which are intrinsic to people in motion. Something wonderful happens to people when they are somehow determining their own destiny and beginning to control and change their own conditions.

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Peter de Lissovoy

FREEDOM WARS IN GEORGIA

The paddy wagons stopped in the narrow Freedom Alley that runs behind the Albany, Georgia, jail. One of the cops ran ahead and unlocked the heavy metal door, and the others dragged us out and across the gravelly court and through the door into the walkway of the Negro cellblock. We had two cops apiece—one for each heel, and they were big, white, and had a knack for the obscene gesture, which is about all you can say for Albany cops. We called out news of the demonstration to Negro prisoners in the cells, and they stared and shouted encouragement, and some were merry and some inscrutable and silent. The floor was dusty beneath us—dank, running, paper-strewn like the walls and ceiling and air. Away at the end of the walkway a corridor ran up steps to the white cells with their separate but equal filth, and on to mugging and fingerprinting and booking. I remember that, very soon, the desk sergeant appeared in the mouth of the corridor and, rubbing his hands and stamping his feet like a bear, gazed out on the night's work.

When he saw me, he began to pick his way through the crowd of demonstrators. He stopped by my side, and I had a glimpse of the underskin of his broad pink tongue when he licked his lip. "Ain't this somethin'," he said, looking down at me, but to himself.

He nudged me with his boot, not hard, just to assure himself I was really there. "You ain't black, I can see see that," he said. He ran his eyes around the room, and he ran his hand through his thick bear's hair. He looked down at me again. "An' you caint be white, you sho caint be white." His eyes were slits, his voice was rising. "Just what the hell are you, boy? Tell me that!"

I had to smile. I am pale of skin; my hair is the color of wet sand and about that curly. I am what you would call (in one tone of voice or another) a white man, and I had just participated in a demonstration against the total segregation enforced in Albany, and that, for the sergeant, was a contradiction. There he stood—big, bear-voiced, pistol-

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packing and bewildered by my prostrate and peculiar reality. I had to smile at the irony.

But almost at once I stopped. The sergeant was shaking his head, his mouth puckered in disgust. "Hell, you ain't nothin' but a troublemaker," he said. He walked away, and I knew that he was overwhelmed, and beaten. He was resolving the contradiction by denying it, not meeting the challenge I had posed but retreating from it to the safe warm caves of the southern past and their stalagtites of habit. For him, the demonstration was no moral or political act, but just a minor riot. I was, after all, white, but my participation in the protest was no testimony to the nonracial hopes and character of the Movement, just redundant evidence that all colors like a disturbance. In the next day's paper, and on the radio, the demonstration would be so interpreted for the bulk of the white community that had not seen it. I felt that terrific gap between the theory of nonviolent protest and the reality of the Southern mind. I felt my identity twisted and distorted across the gap into *provocateur* or simple mischief maker or even mercenary. When the sergeant had booked us, I shook hands with the other demonstrators. He locked me up on the white side of the jail, and I looked out through the bars of southern tradition.

A Skinless Rapport

The office of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Albany stands outside tradition. If the city jail is a working symbol of the Southern past, then the notorious and famous and bleak and happy little office on Madison Street stands for a new day, for a hope. It is busy, untidy, full of writing, talk, people, plans, and there is in the very air around it a promise and a colorlessness that can liberate as totally as bars can hold.

The front door of the office is very old, scrolled in rococo, with small window-panes. The panes have bullet holes in them, and the office wears them like medals. The door has new hinges, because of all the coming and going, and they fit poorly, like the crisp new brick that props the overstuffed green armchair where it's missing a leg. It is, despite the wobble, the most comfortable chair in the office. In the little adjoining kitchen, there are two patched bus seats for sitting, and a kerosene stove for cooking.

Early one morning last fall I was eating a breakfast of grits and ravioli in the kitchen, sitting on one of these seats that still smell of packages and passengers and motion. The grits were ordinary fare. Somebody had sent us a case of ravioli which was unsalable because the labels were ruined or non-existent. About every fifth can turned

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out to be spaghetti, which made opening a can for breakfast a little exciting, because the spaghetti was much better. I had just lost in the gamble and was eating in silence when James Daniel, Negro gang leader, part-time worker in the meatpacking plant on Sylvester Road, and one of the young people who have worked so hard with SNCC's voter registration project in Albany, came in and stood beside me. I offered him some ravioli. He widened his eyes and caricatured indignation and drew up, filling his chest with air like a tin soldier or a cop. "Whachu doin' sittin' down when you talk to me, boy?" he said.

I glanced sharply at him and hesitated only a fraction of a second before I jumped to my feet, scratching my head furiously, grinning, showing my teeth, scraping my feet. "Sorry, boss," I said. "Ah sho mus' nota been thinkin'—"

"Sometimes I think you're messin' with them Movement niggers, boy," James said. "Sometimes I think you *are* a Movement ni—"

"Oh no, boss," I pleaded. "Why one a them white boys, one a them communists you always warnin' me 'bout stopped me yesterday an' starts talkin' 'bout votin', an' you know what ah says to 'im, boss? Ah tol' 'im me an' mah bossman we gets along fine, he good to me, what ah wanna vote f'r?"

James looked thoughful. "Well, you done right there boy." He thought. "Maybe you all right after all." He seemed to consider it. "I'll tell you what, boy, you get me one a them agitators—*get* one of them, see—you got a knife—an' I may give you a raise. How'd you like to be makin' five dollars a week, boy? How'd you like that?"

James could keep a straight face no longer. He started to laugh.

"Oh, thata be mighty fine, bossman," I said. "Ah sure will try." And then I started to laugh too. I slumped into the seat. "I'll give him some of this ravioli."

"You eat too much anyway," James said. "Let's go."

I gulped the stuff down, happy, aware of our triumph. Moments like these, when we could gain distance from the traditional black-white roles and kid them were affirmation of Movement hopes for the future, for a skinless rapport among humans. And the joking was a source of strength for us both, a form of prayer that we might go on working and hoping, and some day put an end to the relationships we joked about.

When I had finished my ravioli, we walked out of the office and along Madison Street.

Getting Out the Vote

"So Slater King is runnin' for mayor," James said, abruptly. "If

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we work at it, if we can really make the people understand, you never can tell." Slater King, the president of the Albany Movement, had recently qualified as a candidate for mayor, had announced he would run, and was the first Negro in the history of the city ever to do so. The elections would take place in October, and SNCC was intensifying its attempt to help Negroes register and had launched a get-out-the-vote campaign for Mr. King among Negroes already on the lists. There had been no demonstrations in Albany of any size since the early summer, and it was generally conceded that, in the cold winds of Albany white resistance, the possibilities of nonviolent protest in the form of demonstrations had withered to improbabilities and that the vote was the only means of change immediately at hand. Perhaps this was becoming true all over the South. Perhaps the ethic of nonviolent protest could never have worked given Southern realities. At any rate the white field worker no longer had the easy role of martyr-demonstrator to play. He would stand or fall now on his ability to persuade Negroes of the power of the vote.

"Well, how do you think he'll do?" James asked.

"Who?"

"Slater—who do you think?"

I had hesitated after James's question out of an ironic sense that he meant me—the white in the movement's future.

"I don't know," I said. "If there's apathy among the whites, and the Negroes come out a hundred per cent, there's a chance, I guess."

"It don't matter if he don't win," James said. "If he does good, it'll help."

Residential segregation in Albany is a patchwork affair, and we walked into a white area, and hurried out again, turning left on Flint Street, aware of the railroad tracks just ahead, and entering the inevitable tracks-fringing poverty that in Albany, years ago, was called C.M.E., after the church, and today is called C.M.E., after a way of life —the C for crime, the M for murder, the E for that punishment or reward or fulfillment or probability, the electric chair.

On Flint Street, approaching Davis and The Corner, the houses were squat, gray, unpainted, cracked. On Roosevelt Street, farther on, they were yellow and neat as orange crates. We had stopped the day before at the end of this street, where the little yellow houses are turned back by a lumber yard, and today we would move on, into Roosevelt Alley. We cut between two of the houses, picking our way through sparse grass and rusting wagons and headless rubber ducks. We decided to walk clear to the end of the alley and work back, so that the last house was the first for us, and when we rapped at the door all was

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silent. Everyone was at work or out hunting it. We would have to come back in the evening. I was reaching to knock at the second house when, from the third, the porch next door, half-hidden by a growth of shrubbery, a woman called James's name.

He tiptoed and peered to catch a glimpse of her. "That's some kind of cousin of mine," he said, under his breath. "I forgot she lived here."

We trotted round to her house, and when we stood on the porch, he said, "Betty Lee!"

"James Daniel!" she said again. "What're you doin' these days?" She had a baby on her right hip. Her feet were bare.

"I'm workin' with the Movement—full time," James said. "You probably heard Slater King's gonna run for mayor. We're tryin' to get to everybody 'n be sure they vote. You registered?"

"Who? Registered? Me? No, Lord! Who's your friend, James?"

"Betty Lee! You ain't registered?" When she was silent, he introduced me.

"Where you from?" she asked. The question was always there. What it really meant was what on earth are you *doing,* anyway.

"I was born up north," I said. "But I'm really from all over. I'm from the U.S., like you."

"Like me! You ever tell that to one a these white folks down here?"

I laughed. "The other day—that fella runs the Stop and Save over on—what was that street, James? Anyway—he drew a knife. He says, 'This ain' no U.S., boy, this here Albany Georgia.' They're somethin', these crackers."

"Yeah," she said, a little amazed, a little amused, a little suspicious, a little happy.

James interrupted, returning to business. "Look, Betty Lee, you ain't scared to register, are you?"

She turned back to him, her face clouding. "Hell yes I'm scared, James Daniel. You ain't got nothin' to lose. An' your friend, he's white, he don' have to worry. I got my chillern. You heard what they done to Mae Liza. She went to jail with you all in the summer an' her landlord run her out."

"This ain't demonstratin', Betty; this is votin'. The constitution—"

"James, stop pickin' at me! I know what I want. I know these crackers don' know nothin' 'bout no constitution." She turned back to me.

"What're you gettin' outa this, anyhow?" she asked.

The question, put so baldly, was a little stunning. I had long since given up deluding myself that I was sacrificing anything by working with the movement, risking anything. I knew I was getting *something*

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out of it all—probably more than I was giving—but I wasn't sure yet what. I tried to explain that there were all sorts of rewards. She looked skeptical. I was asking her to accept paradox. I was always asking it. The white civil rights worker talks and breathes and eats and goes about the southern streets with the request in his hands and on his lips and in his eyes, like an aura. Southern tradition says that whites go among blacks for material gain. There is a minor tradition of white kindness, of course—kindness with that sweet, fatherly, denying smile. But white solidarity is something new, and it is the daily and unending dilemma of the white field worker that he must convince Negroes of his personal and exceptional reality at the same time he is defining and denouncing the social reality of which he is the exception.

After a while, James again returned the conversation to Slater King's election, and a few moments later, the woman's husband or boy friend appeared. I recognized him. He was a checkers player, who, not working because there was no work, played a good deal of pool as well. He nodded at me, and he shook his head and glared at James.

"What's that man gonna do for me? He don' know me. He don' never come to C.M.E. He gonna get me a job? Hell man, these big Negroes, they bad as the whites."

I tried to object: "Look, there's a lot of things he wouldn't be able to do. Sure. But suppose the Negroes, voting as a block, put a man in office. They've got some control over him and so he gets some streets paved. Maybe he talks about a rent ordinance. He gets some places downtown integrated. It's not much, but it's a start, an' you gotta start somewhere."

But I knew that this didn't help. I knew what had to be said. And James knew.

"Look man, the man's black. Black, you hear? Don't that mean nothin' at all to you?"

James turned and started from the porch. He had a fine sense of drama—he knew just how to rock a man back on his heels and leave him there, thinking. And it was a rule of thumb that resistance probably will be made only more rigid by prolonged argument—especially when egos become involved. We would come back again. I followed James, waving good-bye. The man waved and the woman waved and she picked up the baby's hand and waved it. In the street I felt a familiar and a bittersweet wonder. How exactly had I influenced the dialogue?

That was the crucial question of course. In the evening I got a kind of an answer. James and I had taken in a show in Albany's Harlem.

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It was a good show, with a virtuous hero and a chase and plenty of deep-breathing exercises. We came out into the street just as two cops swung by, walking their beat. Their glance swept easily over us.

"They don't pay you no attention no more."

"Yeah," I said. "The white nigger. Is that good?"

"Well you can't change cops. But look here, there a whole lot a people don't give you no second looks these days." A little farther on he said, "Trouble with you and me, we way ahead of the times. I don't have to hate you, you don't have to fear me. But most of these people, they still gotta hate an' fear—an' usually they got a pretty good reason for it. I mean, you look at 'em like a friend, but they just can't look at you the same way. So you gonna have a hard time gettin' to some of 'em, gettin' 'em to want to register—harder'n me." He paused a moment. "But you know, I figure you can look at the Movement in a lot of ways. You—a white cat—you really get to just a few people even, just a few, but so that they stop thinkin' it's somethin' different or special. That's the Movement too—see?"

I remember it took me a long time to answer. "Sure," I said finally. We passed an eatery. I stopped. "Uh—bossman! Ah done put in a good hard day's work, you can't deny that, can you? Bossman—how 'bout buyin' me a hamburger?"

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Raymond Williams

PRELUDE TO ALIENATION

Alienation is now itself an ideology. It is also a category into which many different kinds of experience are directed and in effect lost. Yet the basic emphasis, on an absence or loss of connection or community, remains central to all our thinking. The inquiry that still matters is into the formation of this structure of feeling: an inquiry that can alternatively be imaginative or historical.

One decisive period, for this kind of inquiry, is late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Europe, when the idea, as we now use it, was shaped. The story of the development through Hegel to Marx is well known. An essentially religious conception of man's alienation from God by the Fall, and of his redemption through Christ, was generalized and transformed into a continuing historical process. The recovery of spiritual connection was then in turn transformed by a translation into human and social processes: the hitherto autonomous realm of spirit, in which both alienation and recovery were to be understood, was seen as a projection and alienation of human energies, which could only be recovered by being recognized as human. The emphasis on alienation from God was changed to an emphasis on man's self-alienation, from the world he had made and the society of which he was a member, neither of which he could now recognize. The way of overcoming alienation was then not spiritual but social: a recognition by human process of a human product, which could then be changed by human action. Redemption had become regeneration, and the act of regeneration was social revolution.

To examine this development in detail would be a separate inquiry. But we have been accustomed to think of a Romantic emphasis on spiritual alienation, and then of a revolutionary emphasis on social alienation. If we trace the successive systems this account is reasonable. But the emphasis on alienation as an experience, and a connection of this experience with a pattern of social change, was in fact being made in English romantic literature, independently of the better-known philosophical argument. The eventual result was a characteristic tradition

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of English social criticism, which may well have had some effect on Marx's concept of social alienation, but which in any case has continued to offer a way of thinking about alienation, and, more generally, a still powerful structure of feeling. I draw attention to this work, not to engage in some sterile debate on priorities, but to provide one more case-history of the formation of the idea, to be set beside others and to make more possible a general historical account.

I

For historical reasons, English writers were the first to experience an industrial society. But, equally, they had to negotiate this experience without any of the general ideas which were eventually necessary for an analysis both profound and systematic. It is hardly surprising that their insights were fragmentary. What is more remarkable is that some of these insights, so early, were so deeply revealing. What they experienced, and had to learn to experience, was a social dissolution and the loss of a common world. The description of alienation was then variously made, but in Blake and Wordsworth especially, and then following them in Carlyle, the description was given social connections, which have remained important: precise connections, to new kinds of work, to the metropolis and its new social relations, and to the system of capitalist trade. These connections were built on, in subsequent theory, but equally they were connections of a kind which could never become entirely or even primarily sociological. What was offered was not an account of personal alienation in social terms, or of social alienation in personal terms, but a genuine connection of these processes, into a single process. This has radically affected all subsequent English thinking.

It is particularly necessary to emphasize this unity in Blake. Alienation, evidently, is a major theme in his writing, but it is very easy, in a divided criticism, to take either his sense of social alienation or his sense of spiritual alienation as primary. There is of course the familiar radical dissociation of the self, from Blake's Protestant inheritance:

> My Spectre around me night and day
> Like a Wild Beast guards my way.
> My Emanation far within
> Weeps incessantly for my sin.

Much of Blake's work is concerned with a regeneration in which the unity of the self will be restored, but it is not only that the hiding, guilty self will come back into the world; it is also that the beast outside will be recognized. The regeneration is in any case a wholly human

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creative act. The spiritual powers have themselves to be redeemed from their long alienation:

> If Gods combine against Man, Setting their
> dominion above
> The Human Form Divine, Thrown down from their
> high Station
> In the Eternal Heavens of Human Imagination,
> buried beneath
> In dark Oblivion with incessant pangs ages
> on ages
> In enmity and war first weaken'd; then in
> stern repentance
> They must renew their brightness, and their
> disorganiz'd functions
> Again reorganize, till they resume the image
> of the human,
> Cooperating in the bliss of Man, obeying his
> Will,
> Servants to the infinite and Eternal of the
> Human Form.

But it is not only the gods who combine against men; it is also human rulers:

> Shall not the King call for Famine from the
> heath,
> Or the Priest for Pestilence from the Fen,
> To restrain, to dismay, to thin
> The inhabitants of mountain and plain . . .
>
> Shall not the Councellor throw his curb
> Of Poverty on the laborious,
> To fix the price of labour
> To invent allegoric riches? . . .
>
> To turn man from his path,
> To restrain the child from the womb,
> To cut off the bread from the city,
> That the remnant may learn to obey . . .
> To teach mortal worms the path
> That leads from the gates of the Grave.

This alienation is a conscious social process, related not only to the traditional enemies, the King and the Priest, but to the contemporary conditions of wage labor. It is not only the repression that is noted,

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but, significantly, the invention of "allegoric riches," the extreme alienation of the laborer's product. And while the repression is social, to teach obedience, it is also total:

> That the pride of the heart may fail,
> That the lust of the eyes may be quench'd,
> That the delicate ear in its infancy
> May be dulled, and the nostrils closed up.

The whole natural life of man is stolen from him, by his own political creations. This calculating political system (in which Malthus is as evident as the traditional oppressors) is itself the product of the alienation—the externalization and separation—of reason. Many radicals saw God as an alienation, by projection, of human energies. Blake added to this the alienation, by projection, of reason, which, turning to an external system, then oppressed actual men. Urizen, here, is this projected Reason:

> Then left the sons of Urizen the plow and
> harrow, the loom,
> The hammer and the chisel, and the rule and
> compasses,
> They forg'd the sword, the chariot of war, the
> battle ax,
> The trumpet fitted to the battle, and the flute
> of summer,
> And all the arts of life they chang'd into the
> arts of death:
> The hour-glass contemn'd because its simple
> workmanship,
> Was as the workmanship of the plowman, and the
> water wheel
> That raises water into Cisterns broken and
> burn'd in fire
> Because its workmanship was like the workmanship
> of the Shepherd:
> And in their stead, intricate wheels invented, Wheel
> without wheel,
> To perplex youth in their outgoings, and to bind to
> labours
> Of day and night the myriads of Eternity, that they
> might file
> And polish brass and iron hour after hour, laborious
> workmanship,
> Kept ignorant of the use; that they might spend
> the days of wisdom

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In sorrowful drudgery, to obtain a scanty pittance
of bread,
In ignorance to view a small portion and think
that All,
And call it Demonstration, blind to all the simple
rules of life.

This remarkable passage can be immediately recognized as a response to the new conditions of industrial work. But we must note also that these are seen as an imposed system, and yet as the actions of men. The limited vision of the industrial worker—alienated from his product, "kept ignorant of the use," "in ignorance to view a small portion and think that All"—is also the limited vision of the system—the "Demonstration"—which has alienated reason from life. The "sorrowful drudgery" and the condition of being "blind to all the simple rules of life" are in this way dependent on each other; the men are oppressed, but by their own creation. What is equally remarkable is that the development of industrialism is seen in the same process as the development of militarism: each is a change from "the arts of life" to "the arts of death."

The new industrial and commercial system was seen, then, as of a piece with a human alienation.

Where any view of Money exists, Art cannot be
carried on, but War only.

The whole gamut of alienation—poverty, war, perverted desire—is known in the streets of a city subordinated to trade.

I wander thro' each charter'd street
Near where the charter'd Thames does flow,
And mark in every face I meet
Marks of weakness, marks of woe.

In every cry of every Man,
In every Infant's cry of fear,
In every voice, in every ban,
The mind-forg'd manacles I hear.

How the Chimney-sweeper's cry
Every black'ning Church appals;
And the hapless Soldier's sigh
Runs in blood down Palace walls.

But most thro' midnight streets I hear
How the youthful Harlot's curse

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Blasts the new born Infant's tear,
And blights with plagues the marriage hearse.

The "mind-forg'd manacles" and the "charter'd" streets are seen in the same form. To possess himself again, and to possess the city, is then man's common desire. The destruction of false social power is the condition of the recovery of innocence:

The King and the Priest must be tied in a tether
Before two virgins can meet together.

Out of his lost innocence, and through his total experience, man will gain a wisdom which will lead, in the same action, to regeneration and revolution: to recover himself, man must recover brotherhood.

A perfect unity
Cannot exist but from the Universal Brotherhood
of Eden.

Art, as the expression of desire, must fight against trade, which is its alienation, and the human integration is a new society:

The whole business of Man is the Arts, and
All Things Common.

II

Blake's work is, I believe, as well as the earliest the deepest insight into the connections between human and social impoverishment, in the new conditions of industrial capitalism. His revolutionary solution is in many ways wider than anything that succeeded it, for the social revolution and the end of personal alienation are very deeply connected. At the same time, Blake, like every writer of this period, tended to see the new society as a recovery of a lost state. The image of the Fall is dominant, and this made connection with any actual new society difficult. The most common form of this social imagery of the Fall was, in this period, the contrast between country and town, though the idea of a medieval unity and innocence was, in English nineteenth-century thought, to become even more prominent, within the same structure of feeling.

Wordsworth, characteristically, saw alienation most clearly in the modern urban metropolis. Blake's London and Wordsworth's London are equally alienated, but the standpoint is different. The seventh book of Wordsworth's *Prelude—Residence in London*—has been overshadowed by the earlier, more directly autobiographical books. But it is a very remarkable book, if we read it, as we should, for what is seen, rather

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than for what our predetermined character of Wordsworth happens to see.

The earliest observation is characteristic, to one coming from the country:

> One thought
> Baffled my understanding, how men lived
> Even next-door neighbours, as we say, yet still
> Strangers, and knowing not each other's names.

This is the new kind of anonymous social relationship, and the crowded street, in its now familiar form, is an epitome of it:

> The broad high-way appearance, as it strikes
> On Strangers of all ages, the quick dance
> Of colours, lights and forms, the Babel din,
> The endless stream of men, and moving things,
> From hour to hour the illimitable walk
> Still among streets with clouds and sky above.

The massing of other men in the street changes from a physical to a mental phenomenon: the crowd takes on a kind of absolute, single existence. This movement of mind, so fundamental to the modern imagination, produces a new kind of social relationship, which is more significant than mere anonymity. The conscious individual formulates his relationship with other men as with an undifferentiated mass, and feels at once threatened and hostile:

> The roar continues, till at length
> Escaped as from an enemy, we turn
> Abruptly into some sequester'd nook.

What the individual then sees, in the crowd of others, is not men but social types—images of men—and these are exactly characterized in the "advertisements of giant-size," the "allegoric shapes, female or male," which serve, in this crowded anonymity, to give back to men who have no direct knowledge of each other a generalized image. This is then the way of seeing embodied in a new kind of "Public Show," and the detached individual sees show and spectators—the "many-headed mass" —in comparable forms. Yet within this massing, there is a new kind of display of the self: no longer individuality, of the kind that is socially sustained, but singularity—the extravagance of display within the public emptiness. This is again hostile and competitive:

> All the strife of singularity,
> Lies to the ear, and lies to every sense.

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Wordsworth then moves to his most general description of this many-sided alienation:

> Foolishness, and madness in parade,
> Though most at home in this their dearest school,
> Are scatter'd everywhere, no rarities,
> Even to the rudest novice of the Schools.
> O Friend! one feeling was there which belong'd
> To this great City, by exclusive right;
> How often in the overflowing Streets,
> Have I gone forward with the Crowd, and said
> Unto myself, the face of every one
> That passes by me is a mystery.
> Thus have I look'd, nor ceas'd to look, oppress'd
> By thoughts of what, and whither, when and how,
> Until the shapes before my eyes became
> A second-sight procession, such as glides
> Over still mountains, or appears in dreams;
> And all the ballast of familiar life,
> The present and the past; hope, fear; all stays,
> All laws of acting, thinking, speaking man
> Went from me, neither knowing me, nor known.

The process which begins in the anonymity of others ends in the anonymity of the self. As other men become a "second-sight procession," it is not only the "ballast of familiar life" that is lost, but also all that makes one's own self human and known: the acting, thinking and speaking of man at once himself and in society. The self is alienated within the whole body of alienated relationships, and the crucial insight here is the connection between seeing others as "the crowd," the masses, and the substantial loss of one's own most general and most individual human identity.

Wordsworth then comes to a memorable image:

> A blind beggar, who, with upright face,
> Stood propp'd against a Wall, upon his Chest
> Wearing a written paper, to explain
> The story of the Man, and who he was.

The combination, in this figure, of the blindness and the identity reduced to a label, is the fact of alienated man. Yet, though Wordsworth has seen it in these precise social conditions, he goes on to generalize it into a permanent human condition:

> It seem'd
> To me that in this Label was a type,
> Or emblem, of the utmost that we know,

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Both of ourselves and of the universe;
And on the shape of the unmoving man,
His fixed face and sightless eyes, I look'd
As if admonish'd from another world.

This significant conclusion is, I would argue, only the last process of alienation. It is this, as a *necessary* blindness, a *necessary* absence of connection, that the mind actually and specifically alienated concludes. The social mystery is projected into a universal mystery, as so often since, under the pressure of this overpowering experience. This structure of feeling—

such structures as the mind
Builds for itself

—is now a large part of modern consciousness: the crowd, the masses, the alienated wandering self, the blind and unknowing general condition.

Under the pressure of alienation, delusion is generated. It is this, ironically, that Wordsworth now sees:

The Wax-work, Clock-work, all the marvellous craft
Of modern Merlins, wild Beasts, Puppet-shows,
All out-o'-the-way, far-fetch'd, perverted things,
All freaks of Nature, all Promethean thoughts
Of Man.

The "Parliament of Monsters," which is Bartholomew Fair, is now organically related, in this structure of feeling, to the dangerous mob—

when half the City shall break out
full of one passion, rage, or fear

—and to a characteristically contemporary vision of the general movement of men:

as if the whole were one vast Mill,
. . . vomiting, receiving.

It is this mad rush that lays "the whole creative powers of man asleep," and Wordsworth can conclude:

Oh, blank confusion! and a type not false
Of what the mighty City is itself
To all except a Straggler here and there,
To the whole Swarm of its inhabitants;
An undistinguishable world to men,
The slaves unrespited of low pursuits,
Living amid the same perpetual flow

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> Of trivial objects. melted and reduced
> To one identity, by differences
> That have no law, no meaning and no end;
> Oppression under which even highest minds
> Must labour, whence the strongest are not free.

Thus the alienation, the reduction to the "one identity" of the masses, are seen as social—"what the mighty city is itself," and the men themselves are seen as "slaves unrespited." Yet the structure fixes on the "Swarm," the distinction between "low pursuits" and "highest minds," and, thus, on withdrawal. Wordsworth responds to his own remarkable vision of an alienated social condition with a reaffirmation of the power of his own mind, educated by Nature, to retain order, relation, and composure. There is the way out, he still thinks, from these "self-destroying transitory things" to "composure and ennobling Harmony." His way is from the City to Nature, where the love of humankind can be reaffirmed. He can look back at the City and acknowledge

> that among the multitudes
> . . . oftentimes was seen,
> Affectingly set forth, more than elsewhere
> Is possible, the unity of man.

The human instinct survives, as a potential, and within the vast City there are many "individual sights of courage, and integrity, and truth, and tenderness." The acknowledgments are important, especially the first, but the love of man, the belief in the unity of man, have now been qualified by an act of resignation and withdrawal. Under the pressure of actual alienation, the idea of humanity has been itself abstracted and, set over against the idea of the Swarm, qualified. We need no reminder, now, that the perception of alienation, even as a social fact, can lead either way: to the practice of individual preservation, within a grievous general condition, or to the practice of revolution, which would seek to end the condition. Blake and Wordsworth, this early, point the different ways.

III

The writings we have examined were for the most part completed by 1805. In the subsequent forty years, the experience of alienation is very widely recorded, but I will confine myself here to tracing one line of thought: that which brought together the experience of social isolation and the analysis of a competitive industrial society. The key figure, in England, is Carlyle, who, of course, in his work from the 1820s was influenced by the German tradition in which the main philo-

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sophical development of the idea of alienation was taking place. It needs also to be emphasized, however, how much continuity there is, in Carlyle, from Blake and Wordsworth and from the English Romantic structure of feeling in which this kind of unified personal and social criticism was embodied. Carlyle, like Blake, saw a fundamental connection between philosophical mechanism and factual industrialism, and was as insistent on the total effects of this change on the whole substance of man:

> Mechanism has now struck its roots down into man's most intimate, primary sources of conviction; and is thence sending up, over his whole life and activity, innumerable stems—fruit-bearing and poison-bearing.

When he turned to describe alienation, in *Sartor Resartus,* the continuity from Wordsworth is striking:

> Invisible yet impenetrable walls, as of Enchantment, divided me from all living . . . Now, when I look back, it was a strange isolation I then lived in. The men and women around me, even speaking with me, were but Figures; I had, practically, forgotten that they were alive, that they were not merely automatic. In midst of their crowded streets and assemblages, I walked solitary; and (except as it was my own heart, not another's, that I kept devouring) savage also, as the tiger in his jungle.

This, in Carlyle's terminology, is the state of the "Everlasting No," and the emphasis is on a spiritual condition. Yet the transformation, to the "Everlasting Yea," is, significantly, through action:

> Yes here, in this poor, miserable, hampered, despicable Actual, wherein thou even now standest, here or nowhere is thy Ideal: work it out therefrom; and, working, believe, live, be free. Fool! the Ideal is in thyself, the impediment too is in thyself: thy Condition is but the stuff thou art to shape that same Ideal out of . . .

The call is to be "no longer a Chaos, but a World."

It is then not surprising that Carlyle's analysis of the social crisis engulfing industrial England should be in terms of alienation:

> Man has lost the *soul* out of him; and now, after the due period, begins to find the want of it. This is verily the plague-spot; centre of the universal Social Gangrene, threatening all modern things with frightful death. To him that will consider it, here is the stem, with its roots and taproot, with its world-wide upas-boughs and accursed poison-exudations, under which the world lies writhing in atrophy and agony.

In an important sense, this is clearly a metaphysical analysis, but its importance is that it diagnosed the social crisis not in terms of faulty

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adjustment, as so many liberal thinkers were doing, but as an alienation. Contemporary society is seen as "Unnature," and the first example Carlyle gives of this is the transformation of things to items of selling and exchange. This transformation, which he goes on to call Mammonism, is then the practice of social alienation.

> We for the present, with our Mammon-gospel, have come to strange conclusions. We call it a Society; and go about professing openly the totalest separation, isolation. Our life is not a mutual helpfulness; but rather, cloaked under due laws-of-war, named "fair competition" and so forth, it is a mutual hostility. We have profoundly forgotten everywhere that Cash-payment is not the sole-relation of human beings; we think, nothing doubting, that *it* absolves and liquidates all engagements of man.

He relates this to wage-labor and its degradation of work, with its result that the

> Sons of toil sit enchanted, by the million, in their Poor-Law Bastille, as if this were Nature's Law

and concludes that

> Labour must become a seeing rational giant, with a *soul* in the body of him, and take his place on the throne of things.

It is certainly not surprising to learn that Engels, reading this in *Past and Present,* was sufficiently impressed to write a review for the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,* which then, in 1843, the young Marx was editing. It was in 1844 that Marx wrote his own first sketch of a socialist theory of alienation.

I am not suggesting that Carlyle was the decisive influence on Marx in this respect, though he was certainly an important influence, in his very individual combination of a philosophical theory of alienation with a critique of capitalist socety. I do not think, in any case, that we ought to see all ideas of alienation merely as leading to Marx, and deriving their importance from that fact. I believe that Marx's ability to make a more precise analysis of capitalism, and to relate this to an idea of socialism which was more politically fruitful than anything Carlyle could arrive at, was indeed a major breakthrough. Carlyle's inability to reach this point drove him steadily back into positions which are ultimately reactionary, and this is also generally true of one line (though not the main line, from Carlyle through Ruskin to Morris) of the English Romantic tradition. But, while we acknowledge the great importance of Marx's synthesis, we have also to observe, particularly at the present stage of the tradition deriving from Marx, how much, in detail, the synthesis excluded. It is impossible to

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read Blake's description of the alienation of human passions without realizing how much is lost in any theory of alienation which practically excludes this substantial personal life. The necessary acknowledgment of social man produced an emphasis which has dangerously diminished the attention of socialists to our whole emotional life, and which at times, even, has hardened into a philistinism, indeed an alienation, of the human passions. Equally, the attention directed by Blake and Wordsworth to the social effects of the city—the anonymous community; of factory work—the fragmentation within the process as well as in the social relations; and to the distortions of human communication, by image-making and advertisement, comes through as still centrally relevant and still theoretically unsatisfied. As we continue to examine, in our own lives, the whole complex of alienation, we shall do well to attend to this prelude.

AMERICANA: RENAISSANCE MAN DEPARTMENT

The advertising fraternity, which has been fretting about its public image recently, might draw some reassurance from the remarks yesterday of George Gribbin, chairman of Young & Rubicam, Inc.

In a talk before the Advertising Club of Pittsburgh, Mr. Gribbin likened the modern advertising man to the Renaissance man.

Today's ad man, like the Renaissance man, must have a wide range of gifts, Mr. Gribbin asserted. He must be knowledgeable about many industries and must master several crafts.

Moreover, he said, today's ad man, like his Renaissance predecessor, must serve demanding clients.

"In Michelangelo's portfolio of clients were two of the bluest chips of the day—the Medici family in Florence and the Popes in Rome," Mr. Gribbin notes. [From the N.Y. *Times,* February 26, 1964]

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Ben B. Seligman

THE AMERICAN CORPORATION: IDEOLOGY AND REALITY

Power, like energy, must be regarded as continually passing from any one of its forms into any other, and it should be the business of social science to seek the laws of such transformations.—BERTRAND RUSSELL

In recent years, managerial élites have urgently sought to justify what it is they do. As Wilbert Moore remarked in his *Conduct of the Corporation* (1962), executives have become worried about the merit of their positions, the salaries they receive but perhaps do not deserve, and the fact that finally they are accountable to no one but themselves. They know that they dispose of vast financial resources and that the economic health of workers, stockholders, and suppliers—as well as entire communities—depends on their decisions. Management, says Moore, is in a "moral crisis."

The older ideology, as reflected in the writings of such economists as John Bates Clark or Frank H. Knight, now seems inadequate. Clark had announced that by virtue of marginal productivity everyone in society received exactly what he earned, while Knight in his theory converted labor into capital, land into capital, and entrepreneurship into capital, so that in the end capital counted for everything. But all this was too abstruse. The "moral crisis" in the corporation demanded a more supple theory, something not so dense as the Clark-Knight system of apologetics nor quite so rigid as Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism.

The new outlook started a few years back with books by Adolph Berle, David Lilienthal, and Peter Drucker whose messages were promptly refurbished in *Fortune*. Berle celebrated the soul of the corporation; Lilienthal argued for bigger and better bigness; Drucker turned his lamp on responsibility. And it was amazing how many came away convinced, at least until General Electric, Westinghouse, and few others stubbed their toes over antitrust.

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A major theme in this new ideology has been responsibility. The corporation, it was argued, must adapt itself so as to become a domesticated citizen in the contemporary polity. The corporation's very size and its impact on the economy, we were told, willy-nilly enforced proper standards of social conduct. The manager himself, of course, was only a professional, like the 19th-century British Colonial officer: he possessed certain skills and placed them at the disposal of the ". . . vast clientele he always serves and sometimes leads." He was a highly trained bureaucrat in the best sense, and cheerfully shared the world's burdens.

Frequently, the rhetoric from which these notions were drawn exhibited a defensive and sanctimonious tone. Yet all too often the mood was shattered by such remarks as that of a burgeoning retail magnate who told a reporter some time ago: "We're not going to pay dividends. To hell with the stockholders." Now, this seems to be a truer picture of corporate decision making, for it is self-determined in a manner that locates responsibility in a directorate accountable only to itself. Governance in the corporation, to use Richard Eells' term, is reflexive, that is, it turns inward. The shocked recognition of this seems to have been upsetting to some managerial élites.

How else is one to explain the new corporate literature? Saturated with the message of service, the exploration of "constitutionalism" in the corporation, for example, yet manifests enough buncombe to raise questions of dissimulation. The fact is that those who benefit from corporate affairs are those who shape corporate policy. The literature's purpose is largely to deflect criticism. Here, for example, is Richard Eells, one of the more adroit purveyors of the new corporate ideology, writing in *The Government of Corporations* (1962):

> There is no agreement among corporation theorists as to the definition of terms in the chain of responsibility in corporate governance. *Who* is responsible to *whom* for *what,* and *how* is his responsibility to be enforced? Each of the italicized terms is highly debatable today. As to the first term, the "who" in this formula may refer to board or executive group, or to both. As to the second term, responsibility to "whom" raises arguable issues about the relative positions of various groups of claimants . . . as to the third term . . . one gets answers ranging all the way from . . . maximum profit for stockholders, to the more recent multiple demands of numerous contributor-claimant groups, including the claims of the "general public." As to the fourth term, . . . only the most elementary steps to identify ways and means have yet been taken.

The fundamental issue of control is dissipated in a haze of doubt. Those who bear responsibility for corporate decision making, Eells tells us, can-

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not be identified. The outcome is to say a corporation does what it does.

Eells, of course, is too astute not to recognize that corporate power must be made to seem legitimate, but his insistence that this requires a "constitution" cannot be validated by parallels with the democratic state, since the corporation hardly can be said to derive its powers from a principle of consent. The fact is that corporate charters are not determined by consensus and in the exercise of authority might does weigh more heavily than right. It is indeed one's location in the corporate hierarchy that determines how power is exercised. To suggest that directors secure their authority from stockholders, or "from society generally," is otiose.

The truth is painfully reached when Eells concedes that corporate decision-makers often ". . . create power for the purpose in hand and [then] seek to legitimate the necessary decisions." Yet sheer power has seemed an inadequate base for the illusion of rationality, and so writers on corporations, Eells included, have employed such notions as the principle of balance: the function of the manager, it has been said, is to weigh the contending claims of stockholder, supplier, union, government, and competitor and to parcel out justice to all. But such a version of business democracy sharply clashes with the concession that power is rationalized in *post hoc* fashion. Surely the manner in which the automobile companies all too often have abused their dealers is a better measure of the "balance" managerial élites have had in mind.

A. T. Mason, the noted Princeton law professor, once gave away the whole show, when he said of the welfare state: ". . . [it] must be accomplished under the auspices of competent and efficient business leadership." This seems adequate underpinning for the theme that as long as the corporation is successful, so will the rest of us be. Yet the bitter-end resistance of the big chain stores to the extension of the federal minimum wage law to retail clerks in 1961 suggests how well executives have learned to live with the welfare state.

"Leadership" has become a major preoccupation in the public addresses of such archons of business as Ralph Cordiner, T. V. Houser, and Henry Ford II. (Incidentally, Ford, who has often spoken sternly about corporate men who undermine public confidence, sat stone-faced at a General Electric stockholders' meeting while Cordiner heroically sought to explain away his company's anti-trust conviction.) Loren Baritz has demonstrated in *The Servants of Power* (1960) how much of a fetish "leadership" notions have become among the corporate élite.

But there are still enough executives around who know that the notions of governance, responsibility, and the corporate soul can be over-

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done. These men, typified by Roger Blough of U.S. Steel, say that the purpose of business is business. They stress the thumbscrew technique in dealing with unions. General Electric, for example, has long practiced through "Boulwareism" a no-nonsense policy that has enabled it to bypass the hundred-odd unions in its plants and virtually dictate bargaining terms. It blends the old paternalism with the new public relations.

Corporate oligarchs have also called into play the behavioral sciences. Personality dynamics, social psychology and cultural patterns have become weapons in extracting more output from workers. The sense of "togetherness" in the plant that the soft sell may create seems to offer just the right mood to frustrate the efforts of the union organizer. Thus, a study of the psychology of rodents can help the manager to manipulate workers to respond properly to appropriate stimuli.

A more elaborate version of this sort of thinking has been developed in recent years by the so-called organization theorists. These writers, e.g., Kenneth Boulding and Herbert A. Simon, insist that their overarching concern is with scientific objectivity, but their ideas can be used effectively to rationalize functioning of the corporation. In organization theory, the corporation is an archetypal structure whose highly integrated and delicately attuned personal relationships demand the elimination of rivalry. Communication is preferred to command. Information must flow through feedbacks to managerial control units. The corporation is seen as a social analogue to the computer. Not only must the productive process be rationalized and centrally directed; the humans themselves must be converted into carefully regulated units of a rigidly defined hierarchy. Since the organization—in this case, the corporation—is a "cooperative system of human activity encompassing psychological, social, biological and physical relations inherent in cooperative behavior," no deviation from the oligarch's norm should be permitted. The corporate collective now stands as the perfect paradigm for the domicile of an emmet.

The ideological bias involved in these concepts is obscured by an ostensibly neutral or scientific language. The stress placed on manipulative techniques, for example, disguises such issues as the use of hierarchy in sustaining unequal income distribution. Wages and interest are no longer the outcome of social struggles, as in Ricardo or Marx, but rather "inducements" to complete tasks. Administered prices can be justified by such notable objectives as "desirable levels of internal efficiency." That this constitutes private taxing power, as both David Bazelon and Michael Reagan have demonstrated, is simply ignored. With such formulations, organization theory comes close to apologetics.

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Sometimes the whole affair has gone round and round in wondrous circles. Loyalty and teamwork increases satisfaction, which enhances participation, which makes inducements larger, which raises the contribution of work, which reflects an increase in willingness, which leads to an acceptance of corporate goals, which implies loyalty. But, of course, the cost of production could be reduced if satisfaction were available at a low level of inducement: more familiarly, how nice to have lower rates of pay. Obviously, this is an important management goal and if organization theory can show the way, so much the better.

These writings—from the work of Mary Parker Follett and Chester Barnard to James March and Herbert A. Simon—offer the corporate archon a more suitable ideology. By stressing common goals for managers, workers, suppliers, stockholders, consumers—anyone who had anything to do with the corporation—the objectives of the archon become the objectives of all. The problem of power created within the confines of the corporation is dissipated, as it takes its benign and equal place alongside all other groups in society.

Now, it is true that organization theorists are not necessarily liable for the uses to which their scientific ideas are put by corporate ideologues. However, there is not only science but an ethic embedded in organization theory, an ethic that cannot be completely disguised by all the game theoretics and mathematical simulation employed by it. The refined logic has by no means dispelled the aroma of those value judgments that stress harmony and corporate cooperation.

Here then is the new ideology. But what is the reality of the corporation? Now, there are tens of thousands of these "institutions" inhabiting the economic landscape, as the *Wall Street Journal* never tires of saying, yet only a few seriously affect society and the economy. While only 6 per cent of the corporations reporting to the Internal Revenue Service in 1959 had assets worth over a million dollars, they did account for 70 per cent of corporate receipts. The same few corporations supplied the bulk of the economy's jobs and contributed about 55 per cent of total national income and almost 70 per cent of national income originating in business. All the small corporations and individual proprietorships and partnerships together do not have the impact on our economic and social well-being that a relatively few large corporations have. It is on the latter that the community depends.

Here are some of the giants: General Motors—assets $8.8 billion, sales $12 billion; Standard Oil of New Jersey—assets $10.5 billion, sales $9.3 billion; AT&T—assets $24.6 billion (not counting Western Electric), sales $8.6 billion; Ford—assets $5.1 billion, sales $6.7 billion; Sears

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Roebuck—assets $2.5 billion, sales $4.3 billion. All told, there are some 50 names on the billion dollar nonfinancial corporate list for 1961; their sales represent roughly 25 per cent of the gross national product. One might broaden the picture somewhat by taking *Fortune*'s 1962 élite list of 500 leading industrials and the top 50 firms in merchandising, transportation, and utilities. Sales for this group totalled $337.7 billion or 65 per cent of GNP. (A certain amount of double counting is involved in this arithmetic, but it ought not to reduce the percentage too much. If assets are considered, *Fortune*'s leading corporations, both financial and nonfinancial, may be said to hold perhaps a fourth of the nation's total wealth.)

Such dominant corporations are becoming increasingly important. The elementary fact is that more giants than ever are inhabiting the economic landscape. Fields that were once a haven for small business, such as retailing and service, have been invaded by the giants. In supermarketing, for example, less than 10 per cent of the big chains take in 70 per cent of gross sales. More and more, the small businessman finds it difficult to stay alive: the share of sales made by corporations with assets under $1 million has been declining steadily since the war—from 19 per cent in 1947 to 13 per cent in 1955. It is the huge, sprawling business bureaucracies whose decision makers really move the economy.

How did they get so big? The simplest way would be by an expansion of sales. But this has seldom happened. The most common method for building an industrial empire has been the merger, a device by which business anacondas simply swallow their smaller rivals. Industrial mergers in America came in periodic waves, the first around the turn of the century. Since then, virtually every major enterprise has experienced one or more of these economic fusions. In virtually all instances the motives were purely financial. As one economist put it, "... a rising, buoyant securities market made practicable larger and larger units of business enterprise." The archon discovered that really handsome profits might be garnered by selling and buying intangibles, a practice clearly stemming from the changing nature of property itself. And herein lies the reality of the corporation today.

Traditionally, property implied a precise relationship to corporeal objects with an unimpeded right to use, dispose and bequeath real things. As developed by John Locke and in the thinking of the colonists, property meant freedom; it provided a means of earning a living; it meant independence. It gave a man a base from which to speak his piece, a base that was not dominated by either church or state. And it

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justified Jeffersonian hostility to the corporation, for the latter had been in the main a Crown agent and carrier of special privilege. Yet, within three decades of the Constitution's adoption, the corporation had won.

Its legal personality assured by the 14th Amendment and the courts, the corporation lent protective coloration to American industry. Incorporation became an inalienable right, requiring but three names and a modest fee to obtain a charter. Businesses of all kinds and sizes assumed a corporate shape. To be sure, one of the chief attractions was limited liability, restricting the financial responsibility of the "owners" solely to their equity holdings. But the major unintended consequence was to transfer the idea of property from things to pieces of paper. This could be done because in jurisprudence the corporation became a *being,* individual and immortal, and presumably able to manage its affairs as a collective entity and to clothe the spirit of man for all time.

In reality, the stockholders did not own the things that comprised the corporation. A share of stock did not give its holder a right to an aliquot portion of physical assets: it only entitled him to some part of the corporate income, provided the managers were willing to part with it. And if one possessed a share in a holding company, an organization whose assets were merely shares of other corporations, what part of the underlying enterprises did one then own? As the corporation grew and expanded, no one was quite certain who owned what. It was transformed into an institution unto itself, in no way responsible to the shareholder. The latter became less the capitalist and more the speculator whose concern likely was centered on prospective price rises on the stock exchange. The stockholder seldom felt a sense of loyalty to the corporation, for he could always sever his connection by simply selling his shares. True, he could vote at the annual meeting, if he got there, but any notion that this would lead to corporate democracy was rather silly, for scattered security holders, whose interest in actual operations was minimal, could exert no influence on internal corporate matters. In fact, most stockholders willingly turned their votes over to incumbent managers through the device of the proxy.

Consequently, there is no need to search for some external principle to justify control, as Eells does in so painful a manner. Boards of directors exercise power because no one else can. As Bertrand Russell once said: "Where no social institution . . . exists to limit the number of men to whom power is possible, those who most desire power are, broadly speaking those most likely to acquire it." Power in the corporation is now antecedent to profit. Gains are extracted by virtue of strategic control of productive and pecuniary relations; it is no longer a case, as in

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classical capitalism, of possessing power because a venture is profitable. It is enough to control an enterprise. As a consequence, the nature of the political process in business has been reversed, a turnabout made entirely possible by the corporate proxy! Originally intended as an instrument of convenience for absentee stockholders, the proxy allowed management to perpetuate itself in office.

The new managers also have obliterated the traditional family capitalism of the 19th century. Many corporations were once owned by *personal* dynasties: this no longer is the case. The desire to merge and to dominate an industry enforced a turn to the capital markets, resulting for a while in banker-imposed rule. But finance capitalism was surprisingly short-lived, for the new managerial class discovered that with an adequate supply of funds stemming from accumulated profits they could get along quite well without Wall Street tutelage, especially when the corporation itself provided two-thirds of the saving required for investment. (Federal income tax depreciation rules have underpinned a good part of these savings.) Today, it is the paid professional who governs the corporation. In one study of 232 corporate directorates (*New University Thought,* Winter, 1962), 58 per cent of board members were classified as executives or former officers while financiers of one sort or another represented but 4.5 per cent and major stockholders less than 20 per cent. It was also evident that the executives had rather small shareholdings in the corporations over which they held sway.

Sometimes a seemingly genuine contest for internal control develops. The solemnity with which these titanic struggles are conducted have all the attributes of a ritualistic dance in which the participants have no freedom to alter preordained motions. The stockholders—allegedly the legal owners—really have little to say about what goes on. The battles for control of the New York Central Railroad, Montgomery Ward and the Bank of America all looked like political campaigns, with promises of reform, declarations of new deals and new frontiers and invective against adversaries. Professional proxy gatherers worked like block captains bringing in the vote, while the candidates made grandiloquent speeches.

Power in the corporation, consequently, has little if any relationship to property. Control and expertise are sufficient to legitimate the uses of power. Eells has said quite plainly that knowledge of how a corporation works is a property right which does not demand stock ownership to justify its use. And how right Adolph Berle was when he said that modern capitalism is no longer a system of property relationships,

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but one rather in which the exercise of power *without* property is the dominant feature. In his words, a relatively small oligarchy of men out of the same milieu, dealing almost always only with each other, and possessing no ownership relation of any sort, represent *the* power center of the corporation. Thus, it is rather a vain hope that the corporation can be "constitutionalized" to make it responsive to the wishes of its "members."

And in fact, it is technically difficult to impose a proper exercise of the corporate franchise. The National City Bank recently listed 56 large corporations with more than 50,000 stockholders each, and 27 with over 100,000 stockholders. Democracy in the ordinary meaning of the word, would simply become chaos. The very diffusion of stockholdings makes government in the usual sense impossible. Even the 5 or 6 per cent of stock owners who hold the bulk of outstanding shares are too many to effectively manage a corporation, for they still number over a million persons. Thus, despite some concentration in stock holdings, dispersion is sufficient to create a passive attitude. Further, most stockowners are much too concerned with prices on the exchange to be genuinely interested in running a corporation. Besides, such political analogies are false, since shareholders are not the ones governed in a corporation. The governed rather are the direct participants in the economic and industrial activities dominated by the corporation; they are mainly workers and suppliers. It is here that one must begin to talk of democracy in the corporation.

The passive nature of the stockholder, then, allows control to be seized by a managerial corps. Sometimes, more direct devices are employed, as in the case of Sears, Roebuck. In this company, the nation's largest mercantile enterprise, 70 per cent of a $750 million pension fund accumulated since 1916 is invested in Sears' stock, giving the fund more than a fourth of the outstanding shares. This is enough to insure absolute control, particularly when the trustees of the fund are appointed by the Board of Directors of the company itself. It was not until Senator Fulbright questioned this arrangement a few years ago, that employees were allowed to vote for "their" pension trustee. But this in no way has disturbed the self-perpetuating character of the Sears oligarchy. Nor do the voting rights given to future pensioners in similar arrangements in Standard Oil, Union Carbide, or the Celanese Corporation affect the continuing control of managerial insiders, for there would have to be some unity of purpose and some sort of bloc voting for a real change to take place. The likelihood of this ever occurring is dim.

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Robert A. Gordon demonstrated in his *Business Leadership in the Large Corporation* (1945) that majority ownership was the *least* common mode of control in the larger nonfinancial enterprises. Minority control was most typical in more than half of the cases studied by Gordon, while stock dispersion was so widespread in another 34 per cent of the cases that management was able to do quite as it pleased.

Might increased common stock purchases by financial intermediaries —banks, insurance companies, investment trusts, mutuals and pension funds—lead to a new kind of finance capitalism? In fact this is unlikely. True, most of the $30 billion or so of the stockholdings of these institutions are concentrated in a few hundred issues of the "blue chip" variety. But this stems mainly from their search for safety and a good yield. In almost all instances, as Robert Tilove has shown, those who run the "financial intermediaries" usually transmit their proxies to incumbent managements without question. If they dislike what the latter are doing, the stock is simply sold on the exchange. This often does more to rattle a Board of Directors than a threatened proxy fight.*

Of course, managers frequently do own stock in their own corporations, yet Gordon's data showed that all the members of his Boards of Directors plus all corporate officers held but about 2 per cent of the voting shares in their firms. In only 20 per cent of the companies studied, did management hold more than 10 per cent of voting stock. Mabel Newcomer's *The Big Business Executive* (1955) not only verified Gordon's analysis but revealed that by 1952, corporate executives owned an even smaller proportion of their company's stock than was the case in the 1930's. This does not mean that officers have no financial stake in their corporations, for 1 per cent of $200 million in outstanding shares is $2 million, and at a 5 per cent yield this brings a neat $100,000 per annum. The executive does indeed have a keen financial interest in his organization, even though he doesn't "own" it. He thus has sufficient reason to welcome the control provided by the modern corporation; when other stockholders try to rebel, he is apt to view their action as a peasants' revolt to be crushed.

This is the reality of the corporation—non-corporeal property, proxies and the centralization of power. In Michael Reagan's apt phrase, we have now a managed economy in which the central question is: for whom is the managing done? Obviously not for those subject to the

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* *The Wall Street Journal* recently reported several instances in which institutional investors voted against management proposals. This by no means suggests a return to finance capitalism. If the disagreement is sharp, the investor sells the stock anyway. Institutional investors have not yet undertaken proxy contests.

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archon's power. His rule leads rather to a system of commands and internal sanctions which create a tightly-knit operational code. As a result the oligarchs at the top have successfully disenfranchised the mass of stockholders and unless restrained by the countervailing power of a labor union or government agency, are able to injure workers, suppliers and customers. And contrary to John Kenneth Galbraith's belief, such countervailance is not always forthcoming: as in the case of the electrical conspiracy, "countervailance" often occurs after the damage has been done—if at all.

Joseph Schumpeter, like Galbraith, has argued that bigness in industry has been worthwhile. To Schumpeter, the "creative destruction" practiced by large enterprise acts as a stabilizer for the economy, in that it assures a proper return for a sizeable capital outlay. Galbraith has said that only oligopoly—an ugly technical word meaning big business —has been best able to use the unmatched technology with which we have been blessed. Further, corporations are the fount of research and innovation. Yet this seemingly persuasive argument stumbles over the fact that about half the important inventions affecting consumer goods since 1900 have come from the brows of independent researchers working without benefit of a corporate laboratory. Air conditioning, automatic transmissions, cellophane, jet engines and the quickfreeze were among those that came from old-fashioned inventors or relatively small companies.

To be sure, a fair amount of industrial innovation does today appear as the product of the corporate milieu. But three-fourths of the Federal Government's enormous outlay for research and development is paid to industry, with much of it directed toward military application. Although the government supplied 56 per cent of research and development monies from 1952 to 1956, 72 per cent of the work was done by private corporations; and if one looks at *applied* research, 75 per cent of the activity is found in the corporation.

But how meaningful is this vast industrial research, amounting to almost $8 billion? Aside from expenditures for defense—perhaps half the research and development outlay by corporations—much of it may be described as glorified waste, the use of scientific techniques for enhancing corporate gain. Much research goes into fancy package design raising the cost of an item and intended primarily to carve out a little monopoly by making the product unique because it contains some exotic ingredient not found in rival packages. This is then advanced by furious advertising campaigns. Between 1947 and 1957 advertising out-

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lays increased 145 per cent—from $4.2 billion to $10.3 billion, or equal to almost 4 per cent of consumer spending. Moreover, advertising and industrial research often are employed to make a perfectly good product obsolete. This is called "dynamic" obsolescence, and in such industries as appliances and autos it is conceived to be the most noteworthy scientific objective.

It is at this point, in its relationships with the consumer and his family, that the malefic power of the corporation is most clearly exposed. Here countervailing power is utterly absent. Here producer and consumer are revealed as unequal antagonists. One possesses unbounded economic horizons; the other is severely limited in what he can do, dependent on the sale of labor services and subject to ailment and accident. One produces commodities of dubious quality; the other must buy what is available. One is a paragon of efficiency; the other a backward practitioner in the art of spending money. One has vast financial resources at its command; the other, despite the availability of installment credit, suffers from serious economic disability. One invests in the latest physical equipment; the other frequently is unable to make proper provision for human capital. One can build new plants in the suburbs; the other must accept such services as the city may offer, and these are usually inadequate. Yet it is the consumer who is supposed to be the beneficiary of what the corporation does. In reality, the consumer has long since lost his sovereignty and his supposed capacity to influence the social and economic order. Estranged from the sphere of production by technology, he has long since forgotten what property means, which itself has been attenuated to the point where it no longer has substance.

Today few persons are able to select alternatives to the estrangement that contemporary economic and political drives impose. Most of them are found in the upper reaches of the corporation; though as propertyless as anyone else, they do possess power and can exercise choice. As C. P. Snow once said in another connection: "One of the most bizarre features of any industrial society in our time is that the cardinal choices [are] made by a handful of men. . . ." And the choice they make frequently signifies disorganization for the great mass of men they seek to control.

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NOTEBOOK

Neil Kotler

SNCC Strikes the Landlords

A Report from Washington, D.C.

"You can't do nothing with them white folks. They have the money and the power. When they feel like doing something, they'll do it. I asked Mr. Barry [the landlord] to fix my bathroom, and he says he will. Those white folks can't be forced to do things they don't want to do."

Mrs. Thorp, a tenant at 2920 13th Street, N.W., has refused to join the rent-strike organized by SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee). Three other tenants in the building have joined. After fourteen years her bathroom ceiling still leaks, rats still run through the building and create an odor from the basement that stinks up the front hallway (causing the tenants to avoid the basement and pile their garbage in the hallway). Though an inspector recently ordered the landlord to make repairs and fireproof the building, this tenant is resigned to the fact of white power as she has experienced it over long years.

The Washington rent strike began without the trouble-shooting of SNCC. On January 16, SNCC learned that the Shuler family at 1414 Girard Street, N.W., received an eviction notice. Prior to this Mrs. Shuler had housing inspectors survey her apartment and they ordered the landlord to repair the building. The landlord replied that it would be easier to make repairs without the Shuler family occupying the apartment.

In the Shuler apartment the ceilings are cracked and sagging, whole chunks of plaster are missing from the hallway exposing the boards beneath, the roof leaks causing rain to flood three rooms, and in the living room a large window pane is broken since December, leaving the apartment cold through this past winter. Inspectors found the whole building rat- and mice-infested.

The agent for the building filed a suit for Shuler's eviction with the Landlord-Tenant Court of Washington. Mrs. Shuler's lawyers challenged it, contending that they were not disputing the merits of the District housing laws, but that in their client's case it is unconscionable to expect her to pay rent in a substandard and uninhabitable dwelling. They maintain that as long as landlords collect rent in substandard dwellings, the court is, in effect, enforcing illegal contracts.

The rent-strike lawyers want the court to enforce the District housing code by setting standards for housing

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conditions that entitle the landlord to his profit. The rent-strike lawyers also want the court or a bank to hold in escrow the tenants' back rent. The landlord then can collect his rent only if he shows that he has made improvements on the building.

The Court ruled against Mrs. Shuler, holding that nonpayment of rent is legal justification for eviction. It is noteworthy, however, that the Court allowed a full two days of testimony and subpoenaed housing inspectors. The Record shows 37 violations of the housing code. Two years ago, the landlord promised Mrs. Shuler to repair the roof and in March, 1963, the District housing office ordered the landlord to make repairs. But there was no compliance.

Though many of the violations concern structural defects such as a faulty roof and lack of adequate janitoring, the landlord's lawyer maintained that repairs had already been made but the tenant allowed the dwelling to deteriorate. He admitted, however, some conditions in the building were not satisfactory: "Mrs. Shuler wants us to believe that when it rained, a foot of water rained in the upper floor and remained there indefinitely. We all know that when water comes in of that type, it's certainly going to leak out. . . ." (Court Transcript, Jan. 28, 1964.) In other words, the landlord contends it is less important that the water floods the apartment in the first place than that the water stays only a short time.

The Shuler case is now being appealed to the District Court of Appeals. The rent-strike lawyers have filed a stay of proceedings motion preventing Mrs. Shuler's eviction until the case is settled in the courts.

II

Prior to the Shuler eviction, the SNCC students in Washington were planning to launch a direct action campaign aimed at dramatizing poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing and schools, and racial discrimination in general. Their goal was to crystallize Negro discontent around economic and political grievances and to mobilize political action to achieve home-rule (Washington is about 56 per cent Negro). In November a SNCC study of District housing conditions revealed that a rent-strike campaign could be useful. The New York rent strike also encouraged SNCC leaders.

The question remained, however, what problems should be tackled first. Some students wanted to give priority to poverty and unemployment, and formulated plans to demonstrate against the District Commission. A majority of the SNCC leadership decided, however, to first launch a rent strike. These students agreed that the real issue was economic exploitation, as manifested in the housing problem, and an irresponsible political system (the House District Committee dominated by southern and mid-western congressmen) which permitted widespread abuse of property rights.

In the weeks preceding the Shuler eviction, SNCC students had heard about evictions and often would move tenants back into their apartments. Once a SNCC student even broke into a basement to turn on the hot water that had been shut off.

But, according to Stokeley Carmichael, a SNCC leader, these "guer-

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rilla tactics" were ineffectual in the long run. A more organized approach was needed. The Shuler eviction precipitated this.

The rent-strike organizers are students at Howard University. A group of students is assigned to each rent-strike building. SNCC at first concentrated on tenants in the neighborhood of their office. Other prospective rent-strike tenants have since learned about the strike and have contacted SNCC about joining.

Meetings with tenants are then arranged and in the early stages SNCC students often have to visit them nightly in order to allay their fear of bucking the property system. When a group of tenants is nearly organized, a rent-strike lawyer visits them to explain legal procedures.

Many tenants refuse to join because they fear reprisals. Some are aware that just for registering a complaint with the Housing division, they risk eviction.

Once a majority of the tenants of a building agree to strike, SNCC establishes a trust fund for their rents and arranges for trustees to oversee the fund.

Because of the demands of organizing and sustaining the momentum of the strike (striking tenants need assurance that others are joining them), the students are under constant pressure to devote much of their time to the strike that would otherwise be used for studying. As the strike spreads, the shortage of student-workers is becoming more acute.

Not all the SNCC leaders are enthusiastic about the rent-strike. Some believe that it is too moderate a tactic. They urge direct political agitation against the District Commission and Congress. Of the students who favor the strike many disagree about its course. Instead of spreading the strike across the city, they favor concentrating it in particular areas.

Nevertheless, SNCC has organized more than 100 tenants in seven buildings. Twelve lawyers have donated their services. Eventually, the rent strike will encompass the entire city, organized on a block-wide basis, and will involve many types of housing, not excluding middle-class.

The rent strike is not aimed exclusively at white landlords. Recently SNCC organized 51 tenants in a housing project owned by Negroes. Nor does SNCC wish to spare the feelings of Negroes not directly involved in the strike. The landlord of the first rent-strike building is the vice-president of a banquet hall catering largely to middle-class Negroes. When the strike began, many Negro organizations that patronized the banquet hall put pressure on the management to require their vice-president to make repairs on his struck building. SNCC picketed the premises. The economic pressure was so effective that the management claims its business suffered damages of $10,000 and has taken SNCC to court. Ultimately, SNCC plans to help organize rent strikes in predominantly poor white neighborhoods.

III

SNCC's objectives are both immediate and long-range. The rent-strike lawyers in their court fight are aiming to get the courts to enforce the housing code and ultimately put pressure on the District Commission to eliminate substandard housing. (The

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National Capital Housing Authority, a federal agency which controls public housing in Washington, has estimated that in 1962 about 25,000 low-income families lived in substandard housing; a housing official admitted that the housing market is tight, encouraging landlords to charge high rents without improving their buildings.)

SNCC contends that the Department of Licenses and Investigations, responsible for enforcing the housing code, is inadequately staffed. Though the Department claims that every licensed residence (having three or more dwellings) is inspected yearly, it admits its inspectors cannot investigate all complaints and check all conditions. Furthermore, according to Assistant Superintendent Strang, the Department shies away from strict policing, preferring to persuade landlords that maintenance of property is in their best interest.

SNCC's objectives are legislation to protect tenants against arbitrary eviction; to focus attention on the need for greater low-income public housing (the NCHA has estimated that as many as 40,000 dwelling units are needed, while only 8,000 presently exist); to this end to put Washington on an emergency housing basis which would require rent-control and accelerate public housing; and finally, to achieve home-rule, which SNCC regards as the only lasting solution for the District's problems.

The rent-strike lawyers admit that their court fight is of limited use. As the laws stand, the court is likely to take the side of the landlord. SNCC's hope is to rally public opinion behind its campaign by exposing economic and political conditions that have long been concealed.

At least two immediate results can follow. The landlords may succeed in causing a large-scale eviction unless the Federal government intercedes. Or the landlords may decide to improve their buildings and hike the rents. In this event the rent-strike lawyers will have to file a new suit showing the court that there is no justification for hiked rents (i.e., used to cover the cost of repairs) insofar as the former rents were charged illegally.

SNCC's ultimate aim is to mobilize Washington Negroes. They admit, however, it will take time to educate the Negro community for home-rule. If evictions occur as a result of the rent strike, SNCC plans to establish "tent-cities" on public grounds, e.g., around the Lincoln Memorial. As one SNCC leader remarked: "If they evict these tenants, I will move from my place and pitch a tent where the authorities can see me."

A Postscript

On April 29, 1964 the District Court of Appeals struck down the first rent-strike case because the new bond of $5,000 that the court required of Mrs. Shuler was not filed on time. The acting rent-strike lawyer, Professor Herbert Reed of Howard University Law School, was out of town when the new bond was asked.

According to a rent-strike spokesman, there is no way to appeal the case further, since a higher court rarely overrules a lower court on procedural matters. The lawyers' committee plans to take a new case to court during the summer. Meanwhile, SNCC has relocated Mrs. Shuler.

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Stokely Carmichael summed up the first phase of the rent strike: "[It] reflects the typical position of Negroes in the North. The [rent-strike] tenants went through all the legal channels to try to correct the situation. The courts ruled against them. They used democratic procedures, and these were proved an abysmal failure. The tenants must either continue to live in the same conditions or work outside the 'democratic structure.' If they work outside, they will probably be called 'irresponsible.' The courts have not dampened our spirits. More rent strikes are planned for the summer. The method SNCC will employ is 'social dislocation.' It is the method we know best. And we will not shrink from the label, 'irresponsible.' "

Louis Tursky

The Rice Soldier

In the following days Vietnamese troops streamed into Plei Mrong and the surrounding jungles. An artillery unit came to flail wildly at the forests; so did T-28 fighter bombers. Six companies of Vietnamese soldiers were helicoptered in to block the path of the fleeing enemy. But they made no contact with the guerrillas. Why?

Perhaps an American helicopter pilot had the explanation. "Yesterday," he said, "I dropped a whole bunch of those Vietnamese troops into a field. Today I went back to the same field with another load and you know what I saw? That first group was still there in the field, tents up and cooking lunch. They hadn't moved a damn inch."—From "The Elusive Viet Cong" by Jerry Rose, The New Republic, *May 4, 1963.*

Even the least popular regimes in Asia find men to join their armies. These men are the rice soldiers.

They are not soldiers in the usual sense, no matter how much they may look like soldiers and no matter how impressive they may be on parade. No armies are as finicky about proper uniforms and military deportment as those with an uneasy desire to substitute the rituals of an armed force ready to fight on command for the intangible bonds of common loyalty that make such readiness possible. The rice soldier is without strong beliefs of any kind. He is a man with a uniform, a weapon and a job in a

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military organization. In Southeast Asia anyone with an assured source of food and income already has a standard of living above that of the vast majority of his countrymen.

The individual rice soldier may be content with the bargain he has managed to make during times of relative peace, but he is almost sure to change his mind when faced with a risk of losing his life. For his bargain is a good one only when "his" army is not fighting heavily.

Although the rice soldier may understand that he is defending a regime which makes most of his countrymen miserable, he also knows that he himself is not quite so miserable. Since the rice soldier has a job, a uniform, and a weapon which may be worth more on the black market than he earns in a year, he is much better off than a poor peasant or worker. A man who becomes a soldier for an oppressive regime is not likely to be affected by intellectual argument or by considerations of justice or humanity. Idealists are objects of contempt to the rice soldier, a complete materialist if ever there was one. The rice soldier is a product of what Orwell called the "horsemeat economy," that condition of extreme scarcity in which small differences in goods or status take on enormous importance. Only one thing can quickly change the psychology of the rice soldier from a satisfied fat-cat to a worried combatant; and that is the presence of enough guerrillas operating against the regime to endanger his own life.

As soon as guerrilla bands begin to kill and terrorize, the rice soldier must consider the possibility that he may now die in battle. The stronger the opposition becomes and the longer the fight lasts, the more likely is it that sizable numbers of regime's soldiers will be killed. But the rice soldier joined the army for material benefits, not out of ideological or martial fervor; and he certainly didn't join to fight against desperate fanatics. When the rice soldier is forced to become a combatant he is a combatant without a cause. The thought of his own possible death in battle strikes him not merely as unfair but as absurd.

The regime for which the rice soldier works may easily be able to kill more guerrillas than the guerrillas can kill soldiers, especially during the early period when the poorly armed and inexperienced guerrillas go into battle against the trained troops of a regular army. But the casualty ratios are of no comfort to the individual soldier worried about his own life. Casualties on both sides are regarded by the rice soldier as a direct threat to his life—the more military action there is, the more likely that he may have to participate.

If the guerrilla war becomes bitter and long—and that is almost inevitable in all such wars—the guerrillas, as they grow more skilled, will be able to extract a price in blood for every anti-guerrilla operation the regular forces undertake beyond their normal static defense and patrol duties. The rice soldier now sees other soldiers die; inevitably he asks himself what it is he is risking his life for.

The only answer is that he is risking his life for a job, a ration, a salary. The rice soldier of a corrupt regime is probably sharing in certain

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forms of petty racketeering. Usually this consists in doing things that he knows will ultimately help the guerrillas. There is always a voracious market for arms and supplies in a country beset by guerrillas, and the soldier who sells pilfered weapons or goods knows that what he has sold will almost certainly end up with the guerrillas. But since he sees his own officers and political leaders doing the same thing, he rarely suffers pangs of conscience. No one knows better than he that the real gravy is reserved for the higher-ups. There isn't enough cash or foreign aid in any Asian country to make everyone rich, and in Asia spoils are divided according to rank. A common soldier has neither rank nor connections, and he is supposed to be satisfied with enough to eat and a little windfall now and then. With the realism inculcated by centuries of oppression, the rice soldier will not kid himself that in return for his risks he has much chance to become rich.

The armed forces of an Asian landlord regime contain very few anti-Communists eager to fight, even in the upper ranks. As the anti-guerrilla actions they are forced to engage in become more intense, the individual soldier shows an ever-increasing desire to play it safe. Although he may want to retain his job despite the increasing dangers, he never volunteers and he limits what he will do to the absolute minimum. He knows that one soldier can be executed for disobeying an order but only rarely will a whole company be punished for the same disobedience. Rice soldiers have an intuitive understanding of the thoughts of their fellow soldiers. Foreign advisors are often flabbergasted when for the first time they see a whole military formation decide, by some mysterious and rapid process, not to obey a dangerous order.

When the rice soldier cannot get out of doing something he considers dangerous, he proceeds towards it with all deliberate slowness. Speed always upsets him, because it brings him face to face with risks before he has figured out ways of avoiding them. Going slowly gives him opportunities to dope out the situation to his own advantage. Going slowly also gives the enemy guerrilla a chance to escape without battle. This is often an interest that the two sides have in common. The rice soldier hates helicopters or any other fast transport which, by propelling him suddenly into a guerrilla concentration and taking the guerrillas by surprise, force desperate battles that otherwise could have been avoided.

Still, the regime hands out promotions and other rewards in proportion to the number of guerrillas destroyed, so that the same soldiers who have an interest in avoiding battle also have an interest in turning up with the dead bodies of enemies. Ideally, he would like to claim credit for as many enemy dead as possible, with only negligible losses to his own side. He soon learns, however, that this very rarely occurs in guerrilla war. Fortunately, there is an acceptable substitute. Since the guerrillas are known to operate in specific areas and since it is known that the civil population is helping the guerrillas, anyone in the affected areas can be labelled a guerrilla sympathizer. Indiscriminate mil-

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itary actions which cause the death of such people serves the rice soldier's career admirably. That the political results of such actions may be disastrous to the regime is no concern of his.

To the rice soldier, his own side's casualties are not seen as comrades to be avenged but as unfortunates who lost their bargains. The army's dead are examples to the survivors of precisely what they don't want to happen to them. In the face of enemy fire the rice soldier often shows an utter lack of aggressiveness. In military situations in which a bold attack would work wonders, that attack is often not made, despite orders, or is delayed so long that it doesn't work. If ten soldiers are almost certain to die in an assault which would destroy hundreds of guerrillas, that assault may not be made because those ordered to make it will not want to be among its certain casualties. Rice soldiers are not willing to trade their lives for many more enemy lives, no matter how generous the ratio may be. That is why a guerrilla force, however securely bagged it may be, can usually get away.

The long-term hopelessness of many military actions against guerrillas does not at first affect army recruitment. The prevailing misery can be relied on to recruit the sons of starving peasants and the surplus children of city coolies; but as the killing goes on without end there comes a point at which even the most miserable will not join the army. That point comes when the risks of death in battle become large enough to overshadow all material benefits.

The guerrillas have no such recruitment problems. Men are driven to the savage grandeur of guerrilla war as an alternative to soul-destroying privation and injustice, and as long as the privation and injustice persist the guerrillas will have recruits, however large their losses may become. Guerrilla war is based on the truism that with proper motivation and ideology, whether true or false, almost any man is capable of the most astonishing heroism.

A government supported by the bulk of its people, supported by soldiers who love it, would make short shrift of guerrillas. Such a government could be destroyed only by pitched battles won by superior enemy forces. Love however, is never given in return for mere material benefits, not even in the most underdeveloped Asian countries. It is bound up with all kinds of abstract ideas such as justice, expectations, and trust. Ultimately, it may even be wholly political in origin and growth.

Correction

Editor:

On page 172 of the Spring 1964 number of DISSENT, there is one sentence of Raymond Rosenthal's translation of my essay which makes nonsense of my meaning.

Mr. Rosenthal (continuing from the previous page) translates: ". . . and against these people we can only oppose an act of faith in man."

The correct translation would be: ". . . and merely to answer these people with an act of faith in man is NOT ENOUGH."

IGNAZIO SILONE

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Peter Wiles

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING DJUGASHVILI

The writer had the good fortune to be on March 6, 1963, at the Institute for the Advanced Contemplation of Human Affairs in Fordograd. The annual self-criticism meeting in the Explanation Division was slightly expanded in view of its decennial character, and a visitor unknown to me was permitted to help the self-criticism along by simply making criticism—after all, said the Fellows of the Institute, it's *supposed* to be "criticism and self-criticism" anyway, isn't it?

The visitor made a strange impression on me. Initially he seemed to be of the type that, following Professor Lord David Cecil, one might call a flat-brow, or, following the late Lord Berners, a dry blanket. After he left, however, the Fellows agreed on their diagnosis: he was a vulgar factologist. As such, therefore, he will here be identified. The situation was structured for masochism, so they let his abuse run on; yet there was force to many of his contentions, which I reproduce here as nearly verbatim as I can. His interlocutors were sundry senior Fellows, all household names, of course, to the readers of this magazine.

I had originally identified their remarks by name. Now indeed the Fellows this year are of the most various views. There is an open and paid-up member of a Western Communist party, some are fellow-travelers, one is an orthodox Western economist specializing in the industrialization of Southeast Asia, another a professional historian whose "period" is Peter the Great. Several, of course, are Sovietologists of this and that speciality. Also present were a high air force officer from a NATO country, of the "clobber-the-bastards-to-preserve-our-spiritual-values" school, an elderly Russian émigré of violently monarchical views, and Mr. Enver Hoxha, on sabbatical leave from Tirana.

The curious thing is that as I revised my manuscript it didn't seem to matter much which of the Fellows had spoken which line. In particular their hostility or friendliness to communism seemed to be irrelevant. I have therefore thought it politic to preserve the anonymity of these speakers, whom I have labeled collectively, Historical Determinist.

The Discussion

HISTORICAL DETERMINIST: Well, here we are again to discuss the annu-

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al chestnut. And yet, you know, despite the naiveté, if you will pardon the strong expression, of some of the work done at this Institute—and I include here my own—I still say that Stalin's regime was an inevitable consequence of rapid industrialization.

VULGAR FACTOLOGIST: No, because the terror, lawlessness, the falsification, the application of extreme state measures against senior party opponents, all began twelve months *before* Stalin swung left. He was still a Bukharinite when he began to be a Stalinist.[1]

H.D.: All right, don't quibble. It would have been an inevitable consequence had it not happened first. You can't have that kind of industrialization without that kind of leader. The people would have revolted against a milder leader—especially the Russian people, who were and remain fundamentally a band of disorderly and undisciplined peasants; even the party would have revolted.

V.F.: I agree that so much misery could only have been *imposed* by a very strong dictator, and must also have *resulted* in some kind of dictatorship. But before we go on to your view that the misery was productive of something, I must quarrel with the notion that *Russians* can only be governed tyrannically, and would otherwise revolt. It is rather their extreme docility that impresses me. Compared with other nations their history shows no specially high frequency of revolt and disorder, only a specially high frequency of tyranny. As imaginative scientists, clever mechanics and willing subjects (look at the history of their church) they would seem to me to be an exceptionally easy people to govern and industrialize. It is rather the circumferential minorities who gave, and give, trouble to the government in Moscow [as in] their reaction to two of Stalin's major lunacies: collectivization and the *agrogorod* scheme.[2]

H.D.: Nonetheless you have admitted that such a dictator was necessary. And here let *me* admit that I'm shifting my ground a little. The word "necessity" is ambiguous. Stalin was a prerequisite, not so much an unavoidable consequence, of the economic developments.

V.F.: Only if "economic developments" be taken to mean government-imposed misery. I deny utterly the necessity of that misery. Look at the NEP.[3] There is not a single competent Western statistical study of the NEP in existence; it is as if Soviet rule had begun in 1928. Yet we know that the latter years of the NEP, even after the easy period of basic reconstruction, showed heavy and growing government investment, and rapid progress in industry, education and real wages. In face of this record and of our ignorance, how can you say the misery of the First Five-Year Plan was necessary for further growth?

H.D.: Because they had come to an impasse: everybody, even Mensheviks and Monarchists, said so at the time.[4] The kulaks had to be liquidated, the grain supply assured, and the walls of the "little stone house" of the Soviet economy broken through. Moreover there was

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nothing new in any of this: Peter the Great and Witte[5] also laid such burdens on the peasantry.

V.F.: But they did not lay *equal* burdens. They did not drive the ablest peasants off the land. They did not, by their policies, ensure the slaughter of half the livestock. They did not requisition the seed grain or export grain during the subsequent famine.[6] Nor in fact was any emergency measure needed in autumn 1927 to ensure the grain supply, nor did the measures taken actually ensure it. The 1927 harvest turned out to be quite normal, and the 1928 harvest, being a little bigger, actually permitted *less* forcible methods of requisition to be successful. Yet, it was during this latter period, the autumn of 1928, that Stalin executed his final swing to the left. That is, he did so at a moment when the grain panic was truly over. As to an economic impasse, this is a loose and meaningless phrase. However many observers agreed with Stalin, I am bound to ask *why* economic growth in, say, 1929 under a continued NEP could not have been as great as in 1928 or 1927? What technical economic obstacles were there?

H.D.: It is easy to apply hindsight to the 1927 harvest, and chase might-have-beens. The fact is that what happened happened, and even the most hard-boiled Western statisticians show an increase in growth after 1928. It was the new command economy that caused the increase, so there must have been technical obstacles to growth by the old methods.

V.F.: I make no apology for chasing might-have-beens, since that is precisely what you yourself did in your opening statement. To say a thing was inevitable *has no other meaning* than to say that all the might-have-beens have been seriously examined and proved impossible. I, who say the thing was not inevitable, am neither more nor less guilty than you. I'm merely taking a different view on particular might-have-beens.

H.D.: Cut the cackle and get back to my growth figures.

V.F.: Oh yes, well, your figures are simply wrong, that's all. Your Western statisticians make no allowance for the decline in quality, in both manufacturing and building; nor do they deduct livestock slaughter as depreciation of capital. Nay more, the astounding fact is that there is no expert Western calculation of national income growth in 1928–32, any more than there is one for the last years of the NEP. Bergson,[7] for instance, compares the national incomes merely of 1928 and 1937. While we can't really be certain until this work is done, I present my own rough calculation: real national income grew at an annual rate of 7½ per cent in 1926–28, and at rather less in 1928–32.[8] Of course, it was different bits of the total that grew, but that seems to be the picture.

H.D.: Then growth must have been all the more rapid in 1932–37, to reach the acknowledged levels of 1937.

V.F.: *Touché!* The Second Five-Year Plan was indeed a remarkable period, because superficially the economy grew as fast as during the

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First FYP, but quality improved as well. So I am far from denying that the Stalinist growth rates exceeded, say, the American. I am merely pointing out that they fell short of what Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky achieved. Anyway, which would you rather do: starve for eight years and feast for one, or keep up an unspectacular progress throughout? In those intervening years people lived and died. And then in 1937 the Great Purge had begun. . . .

H.D.: Well, none of us—er, excuse me, Mr. Hoxha, few of us—would wish to deny that that was counter-productive, and the entirely avoidable product of Stalin's paranoid personality. . . .

V.F.: If this fantastic event was avoidable, why wasn't collectivization avoidable? Besides, I bet you never said that until you read Khrushchev's Secret Speech. Why should *he* be your mentor in what was and was not avoidable?

H.D.: Don't interrupt. I had as a matter of fact long been puzzled by the rationale of the Great Purge. What I wanted to point out was that when the invasion came the country was ready for it, and only such a tyrant could have done it. Look at Witte, for instance: he was not tyrannical enough and the result was the Japanese victory of 1904.

V.F.: But in that war Russia had no allies, and even then her defeat was really only a naval one; indeed a technical miscalculation—as you surely well know. Moreover Witte had opposed the venture. In 1941 on the other hand, the USSR had, or shortly acquired, very powerful allies indeed. As to preparedness, I omit for fairness' sake the undeniable fact that Stalin was not tactically ready for war and rejected copious intelligence as to German intentions. What about this famed strategic readiness? Why did his infantry surrender in hundreds of thousands, and what was it that finally made them fight?

H.D.: Well, of course—if you're going to get into mere chance military technicalities, when you're supposed to be talking about Historical Explanations—I know as well as you do that the infantry wouldn't fight because it was made up of peasants who resented collectivization, and that it began to put up serious resistance only when the news filtered through to it that the Germans were killing their prisoners.

V.F.: Then there you are. You have admitted that without collectivization the country would have been *better* prepared to fight, that the Ukrainian villages would not have welcomed the enemy with the traditional bread and salt, that all those troops and all that territory would not have been lost. Military morale is entirely on a par with tanks and guns in historical status, and it was not a matter of chance.

H.D.: But where would these arms have come from? Without collectivization, no industrialization, you know. They evidently couldn't have had *both* the guns and the morale.

V.F.: That stuff about collectivization being necessary to release

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labor for industry has no basis in fact or logic. In 1928 there had long been an over-supply of rural laborers flocking into the towns, and there wasn't even full employment in the towns until two years after collectivization. Moreover, the new industrial system led to the most notorious waste of labor, with people standing about waiting for raw materials, and so on. Besides, Stalin actually reduced the work week after 1928.[9] The labor supply story is rubbish, however often it's repeated.

H.D.: You are knocking down a straw man. I am thinking of the compulsory grain deliveries. The kolkhoz was necessary to ensure the food, not the labor, supply to the growing towns.

V.F.: Then why didn't it? Why did white bread disappear from the towns? Why was there rationing in the towns between 1929 and 1935? Why could a worker get no milk or meat any more? Why didn't agricultural production increase from 1937 to 1952?[10] If we may exonerate the kolkhoz from the 1932 famine[11] it's just a total absurdity to say it was necessary to feed people: it didn't feed people, while the NEP did.

H.D.: Well, you may have something there. What I should have said was that the compulsory deliveries were necessary as a source of *taxation.* Just as Witte, so Stalin had to tax the peasant, and Stalin had a more efficient way. And not only did he tax the grain; through his kolkhoz system he could also force the peasant to save. It just is not true that he starved agriculture of capital: on the contrary, he made it provide its own capital, by compelling accumulations in the "indivisible fund." And only a great tyrant could have done that.

V.F.: You see how when you really get down to cases, and substitute a few brass tacks for the passive acceptance of myth, I am rendered helpless. Indeed, you have yourself just exploded a myth: that Stalin didn't invest in agriculture. I agree with every word you have just said, and can only reply that a lesser tyrant would surely have done just as well. For without collectivization, one, there would have been no livestock slaughter; two, there would have been less petty theft; and, three, peasants would have done an honest day's work. So agricultural incomes would have been higher, indeed much higher; and my hypothetical lesser tyrant would have been able to skim off the same amount of capital, while everybody would have been happier.

H.D.: *What* lesser tyrant? You are always prating of brass tacks—name me a name. Do you think Bukharin, whom you evidently favor so much, could have brought the country through the war?

V.F.: No, nor had I Bukharin in mind: he would surely have lost out to someone, he was such a natural murderee. But before we leave him, what makes you think there would have been a war? Any Soviet leader—I repeat, *any* Soviet leader—except Stalin would have used the German CP differently, and Hitler would never have taken power. Most alternative leaders were Jews, and the one alternative Gentile, Kirov, is known to have opposed friendship with Hitler. So did Buk-

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harin.[12] It is certain that on the major issue of foreign policy Stalin alone was cynical enough and anti-Semitic enough and isolationist enough to favor Hitler; therefore he was the most disastrous of all possible leaders. When he prevented the German CP from forming an alliance with the Socialists, he dealt his own country a worse blow than collectivization.

H.D.: I cannot dispute the probability of what you say on foreign policy. But the other leaders, too, mostly favored collectivization. Kirov was a leader in it, Trotsky called it inevitable, even from exile. What makes you think it would have been different under either of them?

V.F.: Only this: that they would all, if faced with the responsibility, have shrunk from the use of force, and therefore they would not have carried the plan through. Or rather they *would* have carried the *official* plan through: the First Five-Year Plan called for merely 13 per cent collectivization by 1932; and this was decided upon *after* the grain crisis of 1927—which wasn't a crisis anyway—had been settled. I dispute the wisdom of even one per cent collectivization, but Stalin suddenly went off the rails in late 1929[13] and achieved 71 per cent by 1934. Even Trotsky condemned the use of force.[14] Forcible collectivization was quite clearly not a way out of the agricultural difficulties that Trotsky's industrialization policies entailed.

H.D.: You forget that the political power of the Soviet state was threatened by the *kulaks*. I personally, Heaven knows, have little sympathy for Communists, or communism; I also know no economics, and cannot judge that side of the case, but as a technical necessity of power these people had to be liquidated for the survival of the regime.

V.F.: The trouble with all you people is that, whatever your personal views, you can only see Communist countries through Communist spectacles, and specifically through the spectacles of the particular Communist clique that is in power at the time. Some of you lacquer things over with a Hegelian morality; *die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*, the real is the rational, whatever happens—except possibly the Great Purge and the Doctors' Plot—is right. Some of you are commendably free from that sort of cant, and never confuse what is with what ought to be. But you do all take the view that "the man on the spot knows best"; the Communists may be in crime, but they are not in error. Now I am indeed afraid of their courage and their discipline, but not of their intellects. I think they are sometimes very stupid, just like other people. I have already pointed out one capital error of foreign policy and several of economics. *Why* then should a Marxist analysis of Soviet politics in 1928, or indeed any other year, have been right? *What* threat, concretely, did the kulaks pose in that year? Was it, however big or small, greater than in 1927?

H.D.: Lenin said it was growing all the time.

V.F.: And Bukharin said it wasn't. Moreover, I say it wasn't, and it

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seems to me I am a better judge of that than any Marxist. Think of the machine tractor stations—they had begun before collectivization, and were actually servicing the kulaks. You don't shoot the tractor-driver, if you're paying him. Think of the growth of industry and towns and education. How could rich peasants pose a *growing* threat to such a society? Moreover, you have to explain to me why Tito didn't fall when he decollectivized his agriculture in 1953—an action he took to remove political tensions and *strengthen* his regime.

H.D.: He didn't allow actual kulaks: there's a very low upper limit to holdings. And anyway Yugoslavia isn't Russia.

V.F.: On the contrary, Yugoslavia *is,* so to speak, Russia; I can see no important difference. That Tito has not permitted kulaks is his own error; but surely if he could buy internal peace at the expense of allowing individual peasants, Russia could have had internal peace at the expense of allowing kulaks. "A man," said Dr. Johnson, "is seldom so innocently engaged as when he is making money." Well, the kulaks were making money. Moreover, in 1933 kulaks were deliberately tolerated along the Manchurian border of the Soviet Union.[15] Now you know how paranoid Stalin was about security in border provinces: why do you think he did that?

H.D.: A few kulaks are good: many are bad. As for your Yugoslavia, it went through a nasty Stalinist period in 1947–50, and China has been doing the same since the Hundred Flowers wilted in 1957. This means that for good or for ill, and however much you niggle at this or that detail of the reasoning, each independent Communist regime needs its Stalin to establish it, liquidate its enemies and develop the economy. Thereafter, of course, it will relax.

V.F.: Stalin didn't liquidate the regime's enemies, he liquidated his own. Moreover, the Yugoslav parallel surely won't stand up. When Tito was a Stalinist he was either Stalin's obedient subordinate or trying to recover Stalin's good graces. However, I grant you that there may well be an esoteric myth of the necessity of Stalinism among Communist elites, or at least among the Chinese Communist elite.

(*Interruption in strong Albanian accent*: "*There is.*")

There is no reason to suppose that this myth is confined to the academic mind. But of course if such a myth *has* arisen, if Mao sees himself as a Chinese Stalin, later to be succeeded by a Chinese Khrushchev, then his attitude is in itself an adequate explanation for Chinese Stalinism, and the latter doesn't have to be any more objectively desirable or inevitable than Soviet Stalinism. Do you think that what has happened since the Hundred Flowers has been good for China?

H.D.: This may seem cynical, but I do. If China is to be a great power she must establish her military prestige—and she has, in the Himalayas. Millions of deaths from starvation she can easily afford—and she has; continued dependence on the USSR she cannot—and her im-

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ports have shrunk.

V.F.: Well, at least you are a consistent "Stalinist." It is true of course that Mao has done some things, such as pursue a forward foreign policy, which Stalin would certainly not have done, even *with* an atom bomb. But if we don't press the analogy too far into details, it surely holds. My objection is to the *necessity* of Chinese Stalinism, not its existence. Chinese history shows Mao turning the heat on and off as with a tap: first hot, with the Three Antis and the Five Antis and collectivization; then cold, with Bandung and the Hundred Flowers; then hot again, with the Great Leap Forward and the communes. Now look carefully at that intermediate "cool" period: Is it your doctrine that it was an unfortunate aberration which harmed China, or what?

H.D.: No, I would compare it to the Soviet Second Five-Year Plan: when Stalin legalized the private plots and the one-cow-per-family and the kolkhoz market, developed light industry more rapidly than heavy, switched to the more agreeable foreign policy of the Popular Front, and substituted Socialist Realism for the mere assassination of literature that had preceded it. Stalinism is very tough, and you need periods of relaxation. If Stalin himself saw this, why not Mao? I might add that with the Hundred Flowers Mao hoped to use popular criticism to correct the party; well, in the Second Five-Year Plan Stalin was also conciliatory to the people in order to purge the party. Of course we have here a little difference—Mao's idea of purging the party does not include torture, false confession and liquidation. But then these parallels are only meant to be general guidelines.

V.F.: Well, here is a dissertation subject for someone. You have drawn a surprisingly impressive analogy. *But*: Yugoslav development and —dare I say it?—Cuban development are not at all the same. Indeed nearly every Communist regime is more or less free today to choose or not to choose Stalinism. *(Movement at the back of the room)* And you will be hard put to it to extract any pattern explaining that choice. Thus the Albanians, if I may say so, chose it because they hate the Yugoslavs, and persisted in their choice because geography protects them from coercion: the Czechs, Bulgars and East Germans flirted with Chinese Stalinism, but are unprotected by geography and are coming to heel. The view that Stalinism is necessary for poor Communist countries, on an Asiatic standard of living, brakes down when we look at Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It also fails to explain Mongolia. That is, we have here two rich countries whose leaders needed Stalinism for their own political survival, and a poor country that always follows in the Soviet wake anyhow. In fact all the small Communist countries have made a choice connected in one way or another with geography, and *not* with their stage of development.

H.D.: True, but that leaves the heart of the thesis untouched. Many of these little countries—Bulgaria, Mongolia, North Vietnam, North

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Korea—may be dismissed as just areas that are only formally outside the boundaries of the two great poles of attraction. What you have now to explain is the astounding coincidence—as you must view it—that when the USSR was poor and needed building up *she* was Stalinist; and that she relaxed when she became richer, while poor China, which now seeks development, is Stalinist in turn.

V.F.: Well, first, to repeat, most of these little countries are *not* just "areas," they *have* made—or tried to make—independent choices, and these do *not* conform to your rule. I don't even agree to your inclusion of North Vietnam there, since this country, though as poor as any, has still in fact not made its choice. Secondly, as I've already tried to demonstrate, Stalin actually slowed up Soviet economic development; and that not only in 1928–32, the entity that Sovietologists have neglected to separate out, but again in 1937–40, which is a well known and well documented period.[16] I therefore utterly deny the operation of any objective necessity, and now that the first shock of your analogy between the Hundred Flowers period and the Second Five-Year Plan has worn off, I admit the parallel gladly and turn it against you. *The principal exponent of the Stalin-was-historically-necessary myth is Mao Tse-tung.* He is applying it, including the relaxation period. He has chosen to discard the merely criminal element, which is a further disproof of the view that *that* forms any necessary part in the syndrome. For the rest the parallelism is so exact as to be suspicious. The original sequence of events resulted from a single personality; its repetition is due to the deliberate decision to imitate on the part of another single personality, or perhaps of a committee of personalities. In both cases it is a wholly subjective choice.

H.D.: Come, come, this is ridiculous. Great nations are not subjected to great historical sequences of events at the whim of one man. There *have* to be objective reasons.

V.F.: It is certainly necessary that there be no technical obstacle to the choice made; there have to be no objective impediments. But this leaves a simply enormous range of choices open to a strong government. Now a Communist government is as strong as any the world has known: in particular it possesses in its ideology and its party an almost perfect incentive and an almost perfect executive instrument. Its leaders or leader operate secretly, and whatever they say is automatically above criticism. The ideology is very flexible and justifies *any* policy in the short run, *many* policies in the long. Why then should not the whim of one man be the principal determinant of history?

H.D.: Because, of course, you can't buck the large technological and social tides of history.

V.F.: A weak government can't buck, but what about a strong one determined to do precisely that? Take, for instance, the "tide" of an emergent managerial elite. What makes you so sure that the new Soviet

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boarding schools will not indoctrinate the young with the party spirit, as they are meant to do? And that the insistence on technical and above all on part-time higher education, will not succeed in its objective—to prevent the emerging of a new consciousness among the younger educated generation and of a managerial elite that could dominate the party?[17]

Or again, wouldn't you have said in 1953 that mass terror and show trials were impossible in the 20th century, that this was the Age of Reason? Yet Stalin bucked that trend very nicely, and so did Hitler.

H.D.: Yes, I might have made that error. To err is human. But now with more assurance I tell you that China and Russia are subject to one law they can't buck and that in the Russian case this goes all the way back to Peter the Great. The law is that it's a hard world, and a potential great power will never become one if it remains economically underdeveloped, and to develop you have to have a tyrant.

V.F.: That is so vague a statement I might agree with it. It leaves on the field of play infinitely more moderate people like Witte and Stolypin, somewhat more moderate people like Lenin, and innumerable might-have-beens like Trotsky and Kirov and even Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky. You don't *have* to build St. Peterburg and the Kolyma gold fields on the bones of slaves: on the contrary, it's counter-productive. Your statement leaves open extreme differences in the *degree* of general beastliness; it doesn't touch the question of the *optimum* of tyranny. You haven't even begun to prove the necessity of Stalinism.

H.D.: I can only repeat: so great and decisive an event, largely repeating itself in another country, can't have been due to personal whim.

V.F.: That is mere dogma. Be specific. *Why not?*

H.D.: If only because history and sociology and political theory and economics are serious subjects. To hold that Stalinism as a human phenomenon was without other real explanation than chance and individual personality is to reject the foundation of the social sciences.

V.F.: OK, if the facts warrant it, I do just that. Indeed as a social scientist myself I am *bound* to do so if the facts tell me to. I think you are all taking an attitude I can only call a sort of intellectual trade unionism. I reject utterly all a priori claims of any particular discipline to monopolize a subject matter, or the right to give all explanations within a particular field. And incidentally, I question your inclusion of history among the -ologies. Surely historians at least should rejoice in the *particular* explanation of the *particular* phenomenon. Indeed one historian has: George Kennan.[18] In my humble way I am quoting him —with a few extrapolations. I repeat, then: if Stalin had had a different father and mother, we wouldn't be sitting here today.

H.D.: So we've caught you: you *do* reject the very foundation of the social sciences.

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V.F.: In this case, or rather in these two cases, yes. Not necessarily in others. Why not? *(Pause)*

The question is not rhetorical.

[At this point coffee was brought in, and the meeting broke up.]

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1 About in October 1926. *Cf.* Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1948, p. 569 and W. Reswick, *I Dreamt Revolution,* Chicago, Regnery, 1952, Chaps. 13–15. I except, for fairness' sake, such earlier intimations of Stalinism as the possible poisoning of Lenin (L. Trotsky, *Stalin,* New York, Harper, 1941, pp. 376–382) and the probable medical murder of Frunze (in November 1925: Fischer, *op., cit.,* p. 489).

2 The agrogorod scheme was conceived in 1949, apparently with Stalin's approval, by Nikita Khrushchev. The plan involved the resettlement of peasants into large specially constructed "agro-cities," with apartment buildings instead of farmsteads, and a further reduction of household plots. The plans were shelved mainly because of the enormous construction costs entailed and probable peasant opposition.—*Ed*

3 New Economic Policy, practiced by the Soviet government 1921–28 with the aim of restoring the economy by making concessions to private enterprise in agriculture, trade, and industry.—*Ed.*

4 *Cf.* Alec Nove, "Was Stalin Really Necessary?," *Encounter* (London), April 1962.

5 Count Sergei Yulevich Witte (1849–1915), Russian Prime Minister in 1903–6.—*Ed.*

6 Compare the famines of 1891 and 1932. The latter was caused, not as is commonly supposed, by the collectivization of two years previously, but by Stalin's panicky requisition of the seed grain for military stock. This was his reaction to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 (*cf.* W. Duranty, *USSR,* Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1944, Chaps. 16 and 17).

7 Abram Bergson, *The Real National Income of Soviet Russia Since 1928,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961.

8 The 7½% figure is in 1926–7 prices, and based mainly on *Kontrolnye tsifry narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1928–1929 god,* Moscow, Gosplan, 1929. The rate of growth in 1928–32 was about 9% (1928 prices) or 4½% (1937 prices), making no allowance for quality deterioration or livestock slaughter.

9 Solomon M. Schwartz, *Labor in the Soviet Union,* New York, Praeger, 1951, Chap. 6; Warren Nutter, *The Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 348.

10 The official index of 115 in 1952 is 6% above that of 108 in 1937, allowing correctly for territorial change. Meanwhile population rose 16%.

11 *Cf.* footnote 2.

12 Boris Nikolaewski, *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik,* October 1956. Bukharin spoke in this sense at the 17th CPSU Congress in 1934. Kirov had done so beforehand, but at the Congress itself he refrained, for the sake of unity.

13 *Cf.,* e.g., I. Deutscher, *Stalin,* London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 319–320.

14 In his message to the CPSU Central Committee of March 20, 1930; *cf.* Victor Serge, *Vie et mort de Trotsky,* Paris, 1951, p. 221.

15 John D. Littlepage and D. Bess, *In Search of Soviet Gold,* London, Harrap, 1939, Chap. 11.

16 The average annual rate of growth of per capita GNP in 1937–40 was 1%. *Cf.* Abram Bergson, *op. cit.,* p. 225.

17 *Cf.* Peter Wiles, "Die Macht in Vordergrund," *(Soviet) Survey* (London), April 1959.

18 *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin,* Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1961, Chap. 17.

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Robert Arnold

MOBILIZATION FOR YOUTH: PATCHWORK OR SOLUTION?

There are two signs on Manhattan's E. 2nd St. One in neat blue letters announces the headquarters of Mobilization for Youth. The other in scrawled yellow paint stakes out 2nd St. as "Dragon's Territory"; beneath it the same hand has painted its biography, "I Was a Teenage Junkie."

Between these signs stands an investment of over fourteen million dollars on the part of federal, state and local agencies and the research of a team of social workers, psychologists, and community planners in the largest effort mounted thus far to attack delinquency in a slum neighborhood.

Angel Merecaido is seventeen, the oldest son of a family of six. Together with his parents and younger brothers and sisters he shares a three-room apartment on E. 11th St. His father works in a factory producing electric hot plates (take home pay, after taxes and dues for a "sweetheart" union that guarantees him the minimum wage, is $44.63); his mother works off-the-books part-time in a non-union dress shop. The family receives supplementary assistance from the city's welfare department.

The major responsibility for the care of the Merecaido children belongs to Ivette, Angel's 12-year-old sister. At an age when other youngsters are leaving their dolls to enter into the mysteries of adolescence, Ivette is "in fact" the mother of two children. She must see to it that they are fed and washed, and that the household is cared for.

Angel dropped out of school last year, at the minimum age of sixteen. He did not complete the ninth grade. Since that time he has worked 87 days as a delivery boy for a local laundry (pay 75 cents per hour). Every other Wednesday he must report to a probation officer; he was arrested six months ago for breaking into a school. The officer has threatened to have his probation revoked if he does not find a steady job.

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Angel's situation is typical of the plight of hundreds of thousands of youngsters growing up in the depressed metropolitan areas of the United States. Poverty, violence, over-crowded living, and fragmented family life form the backdrop against which these slum children must attempt to act out the drama of growing up.

Nearly 50 per cent of all youth in the lower-income bracket drop out of school before high school graduation (an estimated 30 per cent of youth entering the U.S. labor force in the 1960s will not have finished high school). Twenty-five per cent of them are three or more years behind in reading, as well as all other academic areas, by the time they reach junior high school. Of the 71,854 sixth graders in New York City in 1962, 36.8 per cent were one or more grades behind in reading, and 10,778 were on the third-grade level or below. The bulk of this retardation occurs among the non-white group; better than 20 per cent of all non-white youth are functionally illiterate.

A Pocket of Permanent Poverty

Disease has not failed to take its toll of the slum child either. Close to 50 per cent of slum youth are in grave need of psychological, as well as academic, help by the time they leave high school. Among families with incomes ranging from $2,000 to $3,999 in 1958, 8 per cent of all persons were either disabled or limited in their activities by chronic ill health. The majority of this ill health was to be found among three groups, Negroes, the very old, and the very young—the three groups in the population least able to protect themselves. Among Negroes the fetal death rate is almost twice as high, the infant mortality rate twice as high, and the maternal death rate nearly four times as high as that for whites.

The world of Dick and Jane, the middle-class children of the first grade reader, could not be more remote from the experience of the slum child if he lived on the moon. Instead of white picket fences, private houses, and Big Dan, the friendly policeman who says, "Hello little Jane," the slum child is daily confronted with hunger, violence, and disease.

He does not expect to see father walking up the steps, briefcase in hand. Many of these children have never seen father, or maybe they've seen two or three fathers, but never with a briefcase in hand. In his world the cop may be nice until you get big and then he is afraid of you. You are a "nigger" or a "spic" and he is "The Man." He arrests you and shoots the friends you grew up with, and you drop

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garbage or bricks on his head for turning off the hydrant on a steaming summer night.

No one has to tell the slum child that Negro teenagers have the highest unemployment rate of any group in the labor force. The facts are sitting on his stoop.

Against this background Mobilization for Youth came to work on the Lower East Side. Two years of planning and research financed by the National Institute of Mental Health, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the New York School of Social Work, and the Ford Foundation preceded it. The results are expected to set the pattern for the development of similar government-sponsored programs in urban communities throughout the nation.

Manhattan's Lower East Side, the area designated by the project, is one of the oldest slums in the United States. Its history is that of successive waves of migration, each generation bringing a fresh group of immigrants to seek the promise of a new life in America.

Today, as in the past, it is this "melting pot" character that marks the Lower East Side. However, the new migrants are no longer strangers. They are citizens born in the United States, part of the more than a million and a half Negroes and Puerto Ricans who have come to New York and other northern cities in the past decade.

Like the generations of immigrants who preceded them, the Negroes and Puerto Ricans have come to the city in search of jobs and a better way of life. They have turned to New York's unskilled labor pools as their one source of escape.

Instead of jobs and security, however, they have found the tragedy of life in "El Barrio," Harlem, and the Lower East Side: rows of dirty, graying tenements facing each other across streets scarred with refuse, the cries of numberless infants, the six-story climbs through rat-infested, urine-stinking hallways.

The facts of prejudice and an economy that tends to drive its poorest members into a gray land of hopelessness have created among the newest migrants to the Lower East Side a pocket of more or less permanent poverty. At any one time it can be safely estimated that between 10 and 20 per cent of the population is dependent on some form of public assistance.

II

Mobilization for Youth came to the East Side with a theoretical framework which stressed the social causation of delinquency. In its view "much delinquency can be understood as representing illegitimate ways

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of achieving success-goals. The 'fighting gang' seeks to achieve prestige ('rep') through violence; the criminal gang seeks to achieve money ('scores') through theft; the 'consumption gangs' (drug and alcohol-using) have retreated from the struggle and accepted defeat." Unless such young people can be provided with expanding opportunities, the problem of juvenile delinquency cannot be dealt with.

Mobilization for Youth proposed a three-pronged attack in the following areas: work, education, and community organization.

First, to stress the importance of creative work as an alternative to delinquency, Mobilization proposed the creation of an "Urban Youth Service Corps" and "Youth Jobs Center." The corps would provide paid employment on projects of social utility for several hundred unemployed out-of-school youngsters, while the job center would attempt to reach the "hard-to-place" youngster with specialized vocational guidance.

Second, the program proposed to create experimental projects in education to overcome the barriers facing "the slum child in the slum school." It was planned to create a laboratory school to demonstrate methods of teaching lower-income youngsters and a "Homework Helper" program whereby low-income but talented high school students would be hired to tutor low-income elementary school students who are failing academically.

Finally, Mobilization proposed to develop in the residents of the community the necessary skills to cope with their own problems. One way would be to strengthen the Lower East Side Neighborhoods Association. The other, through direct effort on the part of Mobilization for Youth, would be to help the isolated community residents organize themselves to solve their problems.

Mobilization for Youth set itself a difficult task. Delinquency does not lend itself to simple panaceas. Confronted by the hard realities of slum life, the best theory as to the causation and cure of delinquency may run aground.

The question then is: how successful has Mobilization for Youth been in confronting these realities in its more than two years on the Lower East Side?

The answer: it has largely been a failure. In terms of achievement and impact on the community, Mobilization has little to show. A couple of coffee shops have been opened, a service station has been leased from an oil company to provide work experience for a few dozen youths, slightly over 150 youngsters have been placed in subsidized work projects, and some 100 high school juniors and seniors have been employed as tutors to about 300 elementary school pupils. However, the chief

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impression one receives from a close examination of the program is that it has been a costly failure employing more social workers than youngsters.

In the Negro and Puerto Rican community, the majority distrust the motives of Mobilization and its chief ally, the Lower East Side* Neighborhoods Association, and feel that these groups are more interested in securing publicity than in improving conditions. The attitude of the independent organizations working in the area has been similar. As George Von Hilsheimer, a member of Mobilization's Board of Directors, stated, Mobilization has been "wasting money" on contacts with the Board of Education and established settlement houses, while rarely giving money to experimental and independent groups.

Where money has been given, as in the case of the March on Washington and the recent School Boycott, the general impression has been that Mobilization was covering its bets to insure a fail-safe operation.

Many of the youngsters in the area feel that Mobilization has placed a premium on gang membership in terms of its employment program and other services. One junior high school boy, who took part in a picket line protesting Mobilization's employment policies, declared, "I don't want to kill somebody to get a job."

Coupled to this charge is the complaint that the uniforms worn by the young people employed by the project cost $5–$6, while Mobilization only pays 75 cents to $1 per hour to those who get jobs. The boys feel that the social workers "get their money easy, we have to work hard. They just sit there writing with a pencil." It is interesting that Mobilization's salaries for beginning social workers are among the highest in the New York area.

Basic Problems Remain

None of the above observations, however, answer the question of why Mobilization has failed.

Why has Mobilization failed?

There is no simple answer. The failure involves much more than the usual problems of shortage of funds and inadequate staff. More money and staff would simply mean frosting the cake. What I would suggest is that the failure involves a much larger failure on the part

* LENA is a loose federation of established settlement houses and predominantly middle-class community organizations active on the Lower East Side. It is divided into several neighborhood councils. The majority of its active membership and leadership comes from the cooperative housing projects below Delancey St. (ILGWU Houses, etc., and the middle-class area around Cooper Square). It has very little contact or influence within the Negro and Puerto Rican community.

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of the government to solve the basic problems of poverty, unemployment, and discrimination in this country.

Some 26 million young people will be entering the labor force in the current decade. This means there will be better than 2.5 million new job seekers every year. To meet this demand the American economy would have to create at least 25,000 new jobs every week for the next 10 years. However, as the official "Manpower Report of the President" recently noted, the annual economic growth rate dropped from 3.8 per cent in the years 1947–1957 to 2.9 per cent for the years 1957–1962 and the average annual increase in nonfarm jobs has fallen from 700,000 to 175,000.

Among young people unemployment has reached crisis proportions. During the school months of 1962, an average of 700,000 youths between the ages of 16 and 21 were out-of-school and out-of-work. In New York City, 76,800 youths between the ages of 14 and 24 were out-of-school and out-of-work. Of that number 32,700 young men were neither in school nor in the labor force: they had given up hope of findings jobs.

For school drop-outs, unemployment rates are three to four times as high as those of the adult labor force. In a recent job survey of an area in a large city, 90 per cent of out-of-school youth were found to be jobless. For Negro and Puerto Rican youth the figures are even higher; the national average unemployment rate for Negro and other non-white youth is roughly double that for white youth. In one predominantly Negro slum area of 125,000 people, approximately 70 per cent of boys and girls between 16 and 21 were both out-of-school and out-of-work. In New York City the unemployment rate for 14- to 19-year-olds was 17.8 per cent for non-whites as opposed to 8.4 per cent for whites, while for Puerto Ricans the rate was more than 20 per cent.

The prospects for these youngsters are dim. Of the million and a half unattached individuals who did not finish high school in the United States, 55 per cent live in poverty; of the over 8 million heads of families who did not finish high school, 33 per cent live in poverty. These figures become more telling when we remember that the bulk of this educational deprivation is in the non-white group—60.6 per cent of all non-white families live in poverty; 66.4 per cent of all non-white individuals live in poverty.

Confronted by the out-of-school and out-of-work youngster and the over-all problems of permanent unemployment and poverty in the United States, the government has chosen to respond with inadequate and antedated crash programs. The basic fallacy of such thinking becomes appar-

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ent when we examine Mobilization for Youth's employment program. Their proposals do not seriously attempt to cope with the problem of unemployment and job training; rather, they substitute a program of make-work for viable opportunities for these youngsters.

Make-work programs, their social utility aside, are no substitute for real work. Even if programs like Mobilization's could provide employment for significant numbers of presently unemployed and unemployable youth, which they cannot, they would be no alternative to real job opportunities. Rather than providing the training and status afforded by meaningful work, these programs amount to a tacit admission by government that there is no place in society for these young people.

As currently proposed, the government's program to help unemployed youth is totally inadequate. The Youth Conservation Corps and other local projects similar to Mobilization for Youth would at most provide employment for only a little over 60,000 young people. The total expenditure by the federal government, as first outlined by President Kennedy, would not be more than $100 million the first year, about the cost of a single atomic submarine.

Clearly more than make-work is necessary if we are to meet the demands of these young people for jobs. An all-out effort must be made to increase our rate of economic growth, control the forces of automation, and train these youngsters before unemployment begins to reach the recession levels of 7 per cent.

In addition, the government must outlaw discrimination in hiring through the passage of an enforceable Fair Employment Practices Act. At present, although Negroes account for over 10 per cent of the population, they represent less than 1 per cent of the apprentices in such skilled trades as carpentry and toolmaking. It makes little sense to train young people in these trades, as Mobilization has done, if there are no opportunities for jobs.

Education and the Slum

Nor can the problem of the slum child in the slum school be solved merely through adding experimental schools and specially trained teachers—although these are necessary. Nor can they be solved through reading clinics and incentive programs. To believe they can, is to ignore the basic facts of the slum child's existence.

The slum child in the slum school receives a second rate education by virtue of the fact that he lives in a slum. When the total environment of the child is inadequate, how can his education do anything but conform to the pattern?

As Henry Salzman, Secretary of the Ford Foundation's Great Cities

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Gray Area Program, pointed out recently, "The magnitude of the problem has made it clear that the problem cannot be solved through reading specialists. There will never be enough of them . . ."

Conant and other semi-official spokesmen have admirably stated the difference between slum education and that of the middle class school. However, they have failed to clearly face the issue. In a society which assumes that the priorities to be imposed on the educational situation are those of the war-economy and the Organized System—i.e., more technicians to feed the military-industrial complex, ever-increasing consumption, maximumization of profits—it is impossible to meet the real needs of children.

No amount of patchwork can solve the problem of the slum school apart from the total context of slum life. As long as families are herded together in pigsties called apartments; as long as parents are separated from their children all day working in sweatshops; as long as human beings are robbed of their sense of worth in the interest of maximum profits, hundreds of thousands of youngsters are destined to be intellectually mutilated.

Finally, Mobilization for Youth's proposals fail to take into account the realities of power within the community. The Negro and Puerto Rican living on the Lower East Side today is almost totally cut off from any effective political control of his community. He is literally trapped between the forces of dislocation which seek to exploit him and the bureaucratic structure of a government over which he has no control. Without effective political power, he cannot muster enough strength to fight exploitation.

By aligning itself with the Lower East Side Neighborhoods Association, rather than seeking to place control in the hands of Negroes and Puerto Ricans, Mobilization has tended to strengthen the position of the middle class forces in the community, rather than that of its weakest members. It is difficult to see where such an alignment will benefit the Negroes and Puerto Ricans—particularly in the area of housing, where they are already hard pressed by the recent development of the Lower East Side as a speculative housing market.

If there is a lesson to be learned from this failure, it is that no effort at changing the pattern of slum life can hope to succeed without attempting to destroy the context of poverty and deprivation in which Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and other minorities are forced to live. Until the barriers of discrimination, substandard housing, inadequate education, and economic exploitation are finally removed, there can be no true progress toward changing the face of the Lower East Side or any other slum neighborhood.

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ANNE PARSONS

December 27, 1930-June 9, 1964

The brief life of Anne Parsons was a search for purity and meaning, a longing for a better world to live in. There was about it the white beauty of a church steeple or of a fresh snowfall in the New England where she was born, at the same time as there was in her the restlessness of the person who can say "no." Through the lineage of her mother, Helen Walker Parsons, as well as of her renowned socioligist father, Talcott Parsons, Anne was a descendant of Yankee sea-captains, clergymen, physicians, college professors, and of the courageous women who were their mothers, sisters, wives and maiden-aunts. To this heritage, she added that of the radical movement. The person she admired most was Rosa Luxemburg; like Rosa, Anne fought in her own individual manner for freedom. Anne linked her identity to that of the protesters and protestants in history.

Anne was modest, reticent and shy, but she was brave and fearlessly willing to act on her beliefs. She was on the picket line in the fight for integration; she was active for the Congress of Scientists on Survival; she took part in the campaign for Stuart Hughes in the Italian section of Boston where she had established her home. She dissented and made her disagreement known, even to DISSENT, the magazine she admired. Anne brought her concern for human dignity to the field in which she did her life's work—anthropology and psychiatry—a field which linked her strivings for human dignity and her concern with the underdog with the consecrated ministers, the healing physicians, the luminous social scientists from whom she came.

After graduating from Radcliffe in 1952, Anne left Boston for Paris to study for her doctorate in Anthropology at the Sorbonne. There she came under the influence of Claude Levi-Strauss whose own journeys had led him to warm climes—the *Tristes Tropiques* of the Amazon basin and the jungles of Brazil, as well as into the land of the unconscious. The major fruit of Anne's study in France is a still unpublished dissertation which analyzes the sources of French resistance to psychoanalytic thinking.

Anne Parsons found no easy or final answers to any of her queries. She was never quite at home either in her native New England or the Italy she had come to know. She was not a member of a university faculty or of a particular church. And she wrote in a style that fell somewhere between science and poetry. Yet as her family, her friends and colleagues already know, and as other persons will realize when her writings are published, the life and work of Anne Parsons achieved transcendent meaning and a radical message.

RENEE C. FOX
ROSE LAUB COSER

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BOOKS

Personal and Political Dimensions

THE PROPHET OUTCAST, TROTSKY: 1929–1940, by Isaac Deutscher. London-New York: Oxford University Press. 523 pp. $9.50.

Now the author brings to its sorrowful end the story of Leon Trotsky, the biography begun with *The Prophet Armed,* continued with *The Prophet Unarmed,* and here concluded. As biography, it is an achievement unsurpassed by anything written in this century; as political biography, it is unequalled; and if there are few or meager landmarks in this literary domain to compare it with, this still does not diminish its outstanding merit. Deutscher has brought to his work uncommon advantages. He was active for years in the movements Trotsky once led, first the Communist Party and then the Trotskyist organization, and he gained a feeling for their realities, for which even the best academic research cannot substitute. He has admiration and affection for his protagonist but also critical independence. His knowledge of Trotsky's ideas is thoroughgoing and, so to say, "professional," and he is perfectly at home in the spectrum of the radical world. He has studied and portrayed the private life, the family life, the personal characteristics of Trotsky in a way never before publicly treated, so that his subject comes alive not only in mind but in spirit and in flesh. This is all the more remarkable in an author who never saw the contemporary who is his hero. Given a personal acquaintance with Trotsky, he might have been able to deal with characteristics and attributes he does not seem to be aware of. Even then, while the portrait would have been somewhat richer and more vivid, the main dimensions would remain as they are. To complete the portrait Deutscher fortified his extensive general knowledge of the subject with immense and minute research, which included the combing of Trotsky's confidential political correspondence and the private correspondence among the members of the family.*

* Which makes some of his errors in fact all the more surprising: The Sobelovicius-Soblen brothers ("Roman Wall" and "A. Senine") who abandoned Trotskyism to become G.P.U. agents were not Latvians but Lithuanians, as the family name indicates.

"Mill," the first secretary of the International Left Opposition, who also was or became a G.P.U. agent, was not an American, but a Frenchman of Russo-Jewish origin.

Andres Nin was not "the founder" of the Spanish Communist Party.

The leader of the Norwegian Labor

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And the result of all this is served to the reader in a splendorous prose which seems especially suitable for the aim of this work: to give life, light and coherence to the interplay of a highly dramatic personal record, a vast conflict of men, ideas and movements, and some of the most tempestuous events of our time.

The last volume of the trilogy covers the period from Trotsky's deportation from Russia to Turkey to the time of his murder in Mexico. Stalin's was the hand that directed both the banishment and the assassination. This already indicates that the biography deals as it must with the life of both antagonists, their ideas and deeds, and the clash between them. A triumph of the book is the truly pulsing and unforgettable picture it gives of the meaning, realized in Trotsky, of devotion to ideals and ideas regardless of personal consequences, of defiance of a most powerful vindictive tyrant, of confidence in the perseverance, the capacity for recuperation and for self-emancipation of the disinherited. There was not an iota of posturing or ritual pietism in these characteristics. They were his nature and his true convictions. He sustained them in the face of such political and personal adversity as no contemporary was forced to endure.

In the last dozen years of his life, every one of his political or personal friends, intimates, associates in Russia was imprisoned and driven to his death, or just plain murdered—except for the very few allowed to die a natural death. The victims of Stalin's massacres included virtually every leader and prominent militant of the Bolshevik revolution and the Communist International. Except for his wife and one grandson, Trotsky saw every member of his family hounded to death or murdered: all four of his children, his two sons-in-law and their children, his sister and her husband, his first wife—and then he himself was murdered by the same hand. I know of no other person in history who was subjected to such a long-lasting and systematically planned campaign of personal and political vilification as Trotsky suffered. No government in Europe would grant Trotsky the secure asylum (more-or-less) that Western Europe granted all Russian revolutionists in defiance of the Romanov Tsars, but which none of them would grant him

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Party and, earlier, of the Communist Party, who befriended Trotsky in Norwegian exile was not "Schöffle" but Olav Scheflo.

Writers of the Jewish-American press "who had hitherto described themselves" as Trotsky's admirers did not turn upon him during the Moscow Trials, as Deutscher suggests. B. Z. Goldberg to whom alone he refers was the notorious exception. All the Yiddish press here condemned the trials, with the exception of course of the Stalinist daily.

It is not *quite* correct that Walter Krivitsky, who broke with the G.P.U., "sought contact" with Trotsky. I tried for hours to urge Krivitsky during a secret visit to my rooms to see Trotsky in Mexico. Despondent, demoralized, almost suicidal, Krivitsky refused. "I know what will happen. The Old Man will seek to convince me. . . . I am too old to start a second political life."

And so on. But these are little things. Not so little, however, is Deutscher's account of the split in the Trotskyist movement upon the outbreak of the war. Like other references of the same type, it is invention, not discovery. Deutscher should stick to history, at which he is talented; and eschew fiction, at which he is trivial.

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in defiance of the "socialist" Tsar.

In his last dozen years, every one of Trotsky's political hopes was cruelly dashed. The events in Russia, Germany, Austria, the Saar, France, Spain followed their dismal course in every direction save the one he worked for. The gulf between him and the parties of the Communist International became unbridgeable. His maneuvers with the parties of the Socialist International yielded no glory and no fruit. His efforts to establish his own world-wide movement failed completely. The Fourth International, which was to be the regenerated movement of Communism, was still-born. It exerted no influence whatever on events, it exercised no political influence in any country up to the time of Trotsky's death or for the quarter century afterward, except, to a tiny extent, in two countries which are as far from each other as they are from importance in the world today. As Deutscher notes, Trotsky did not even mention the Fourth International in the will he left behind. (It is most strange: both leaders of the Bolshevik revolution left "testaments" which are unique in the annals of the revolutionary movement and, by coincidence, although for different reasons, the documents were in both cases concealed for years not only from the public but from their own followers.)

Trotsky often repeated that he knew no personal tragedy, and in the thought he tried to convey he was right. But personal tragedy knew him, intimately and bitterly and to his last hour.

Here two questions arise: Was the tragic element in Trotsky's life only personal? Was the tragedy his alone?

Deutscher does not fail—quite the contrary--to bring Trotsky to life as a human being. But, primarily, it is a political biography he has written. The two questions are therefore his main province. All the elements for the answers are provided in the work, even if the proportions allotted, the relative emphasis placed upon them, are not always satisfactory.

The last two decades of Trotsky's life are devoted overwhelmingly to his fight against the rise of Stalinism. It is on the basis of this fight that Trotsky should be judged, at least for the period in question.

Almost from the very beginning of the open fight against his opponents in 1923, Trotsky suggested that they were abandoning the basic principles of the Bolshevik revolution and of Marxism in two fields: at home, in domestic policy, and internationally, in foreign policy. By 1925, the suggestions were accusations, precise and unequivocal, and they were thereafter pressed with rising sharpness.

—At home, the Bolshevik revolution could either advance toward socialism or fall back to capitalism. Stalinism represented a reaction against the principles and achievements of the revolution. The quintessential social nature of this reaction, stripped of all verbiage, ideology, deception and self-deception, was the restoration of the rule of capitalism in its most brutal form. The Stalinist bureaucracy, the Stalinist faction, is the channel for the return of bourgeois rule in Russia.

This was the central theme of literally dozens of articles, theses, resolutions, platform speeches, faction circulars and the like which formed the indictment of Trotsky and his supporters against the Stalinists.

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—The bureaucracy—sometimes it was the bureaucracy as a whole, sometimes it was the right wing of the bureaucracy with the Stalino-Centrists inexorably following suit—is capitulating to the kulak and the Nep-man, to the bougeoisie or the neo-bourgeoisie. It is already taking steps to undermine the nationalization of the land, the state monopoly of foreign trade, and is prepared to take other steps which will destroy all the foundation stones of socialism in Russia. It is resisting planning, industrialization and collectivization of agriculture because it is more and more the helpless instrument of capitalist elements in town and country, at home and abroad.

When the leadership began disclosing the split in its ranks between the Bukharinists and the Stalinists, Trotsky regarded the development as a mighty confirmation of his analysis and the course of his fight. By 1928, already expelled from the party, he sounded the tocsin that the revolution itself was in imminent danger of destruction. The Bukharinist "right" wing is openly yielding to the restorationist forces; it is the agency of the bourgeois counterrevolution. The Stalinists—the "bureaucratic centrists" — are heedless and headless and helpless. The Left Opposition alone clearly and consciously defends the imperilled revolution. The final battle in which the fate of the revolution is to be decided is about to be fought!

In a sensational article which was one of the formal pretexts for his deportation to Turkey, he brought this analysis to its peak. What is happening in the country now is the unwinding of the October film backward—Kerenskyism in reverse. Under Kerensky there was a dual power situation, in which the power and rule of the bourgeoisie was overturned by the power and rule of the proletariat. Once again there is a dual power situation in the country—except that now the power and rule of the proletariat is being overturned by the power and rule of the counterrevolutionary propertied classes. The proletarian class is represented by the Opposition; the bourgeois elements by the Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky right wing. The Stalinist faction in the decisive battle that lies ahead will count for next to nothing. It represents only the bureaucratic apparatus. It seems to be powerful, but because it does not represent any of the decisive classes, it is doomed to capitulate to the right wing. Time and again—as in this article—Trotsky reiterated: the right-wing "tail" will come down upon the centrist head and smash it. He even saw the immediate prospect of a Bonapartist coup d'Etat and even named two possible candidates for the man on horseback—Voroschilov and Tukhachevsky.

For all that was true and brilliant in this analysis, its flaw was that it was fundamentally wrong. There was no "dual power" situation in the country, and if there was, Trotsky never explained what happened to it; indeed, he never mentioned it again. The Stalinists did not capitulate to the "right wing," but destroyed it root and branch, with very little effort, in very little time, and for good and aye. The Stalinists did not capitulate to the bourgeoisie, the Nep-man and the kulak, but wiped them out as no one before had ever dreamed, let alone proposed, to wipe them out. The Stalinists did not restore capitalism or

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undermine state property in industry or agriculture but rather expanded them on a scale and at a pace that still fills most of the world with awe.

For all the subsequent rationalization, the fact remains that Trotsky (and of course not he alone) had no room in his analysis or program for this stupefying development. During the entire first period of Stalin's crucial changeover which was to disclose the true social nature of the collectivist bureaucracy, Trotsky persisted desperately but helplessly in his basic analysis. To keep his followers from going over to Stalin, he bombarded them with polemical insistences that Stalin's policy did not represent a left course but only a left zigzag which would, any minute now, be over-compensated by a long and lasting zigzag to the right, and that this was in the unchangeable nature of Stalinism. This too was fundamentally wrong, and the apparently air-tight arguments of this brilliant and forceful mind began to have less and less effect upon his followers. Some resisted Stalinism to the end, to the grim and grisly end. But practically all the leaders of the Opposition, by twos and threes, then by dozens and scores, capitulated to Stalin. It was their tragedy: and even though he would not and did not capitulate, it was Trotsky's tragedy too.

His whole intellectual formation, all that he had acquired of the doctrine, the politics of Marxism, told Trotsky and his followers that the Stalinist bureaucracy was moving away from socialism, from its ideals, its policies, its internationalism and democratism, its altogether working-class character, its standards of conduct, its values and traditions. The same formation told Trotsky that the sole alternative to socialism is capitalism. If you are not moving in the one direction, you are moving in the other. He was therewith predisposed, so to say, to see in the Stalinist departure from the road to socialism the first and then the next and then the next step along the road back to capitalism. He could not conceive of the real prospect—who could? who did?—that the historical dilemma as posed originally by Marx and Engels—*socialism or barbarism*—might, under certain conditions, be resolved for a time in the emergence of a barbarism that was not only anti-proletarian and anti-socialist but no less anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist.

Because this possibility was outside his range, the profound and durable turn made by the Stalinist bureaucracy at the crucial moment left Trotsky disarmed in the terms in which he had posed and for long persisted in posing the social dilemma, namely, socialism or capitalism. In every important respect, Stalin moved Russia further and further away from socialism—yet at the same time further and further away from capitalism.

One end of a trap thus sprang shut on Trotsky. He continued to denounce the deceits and the appalling barbarities of Stalinism, but a trap had half closed on him. The course of this new bureaucracy had completely refuted his basic analysis of its social and political nature. He was compelled, so reluctantly and with so much unacknowledged self-repudiation, to transcribe the "channel of capitalist restoration" into the "guardian of the economic foundations of socialism"—the bad guardian, the bureau-

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cratic guardian, the despotic and bloody guardian, but guardian just the same. And no matter what this guardian did to debase, to exploit, to oppress, even to massacre the working class—even when it exceeded the most reactionary bourgeois regime of its time in these respects—Trotsky did not tire of repeating that he would defend its regime "unconditionally" in war.

No Communist could be won to such a banner once Stalin's course became definite, and from the early thirties onward the Trotsky movement did not win any. In exchange, it lost many of its own followers.

With the beginning of the World War, the other end of the trap sprang shut on Trotsky. The integral corollary to Trotsky's charge that in domestic policy Stalinism was capitulating to the native bourgeoisie, was that in foreign policy Stalinism was capitulating to the world bourgeoisie and its well-known labor lieutenants, the Social Democracy. The world revolution was completely abandoned by Stalinism and replaced by the national-socialist conception embodied in the notorious theory of "socialism in a single country." None of Trotsky's charges seemed, for years, to be as well-grounded as this one. It was no less wrong, and certainly as misleading and disorienting, as the analysis of the nature of Stalinism inside Russia. Beginning with Poland and the Baltic countries, Stalin did not "capitulate to the bourgeosie" abroad, but destroyed it and along with it all private ownership.

What remained of the counterrevolutionary role of Stalinism outside Russia — if counterrevolution could only mean, as it did to Trotsky, the restoration or preservation of capitalist property? At first, Trotsky, pinned by the horns of his dilemma, sought to fit the reality into a new and startling category: the Stalinist bureaucracy was carrying out a "counterrevolutionary social revolution." This was pretty strong tobacco, and Trotsky must have felt in some way the disaster it connoted from every conceivable standpoint.

This is more than amply indicated by the thoughts Trotsky set down right after the proclamation of the grotesque counterrevolutionary revolution. For the first time in his life, he acknowledged that the Stalinist bureaucracy might soon prove to have been the representative of a new ruling class and its regime the forerunner of a new barbarism, the exploitive society of "bureaucratic collectivism." Whatever else could be said about this statement, which left all his followers speechless, it sufficed, by itself, to free Trotsky from the noose of the dogma which he had improvised late in life, namely, that the mere existence of statified property in Russia justified designating the Stalinist regime as a workers' state deserving the allegiance of all socialists, regardless of all other considerations. Trotsky was never given, or he never gave himself, the opportunity to return to more extensive reflections on the seminal theme he had opened up.

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All this seems to me to be overridingly central to an understanding and an appraisal of Trotsky's magnificent resistance to Stalinism, and of how the axis of the resistance was so very understandably misplaced. It seems to me

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to provide a key, if not the key, to the calamitous misjudgment of Stalinism displayed by Roosevelt and Churchill toward the end of the war: were they too not convinced, in their own way, that Stalin was "capitulating" to the world bourgeoisie and ready, if thrown a sop, to confine himself to "socialism in a single country"? It seems to me to provide *one* of the keys to an understanding of axial problems of the "emerging nations." It seems to me to help rid socialist thought of the incubus of the nationalization-dogma, the view that the mere statification of property, even if accompanied by a tyranny over the people, makes a regime working-class or socialist. It seems to me of some aid in reducing the proportions of the absurdities of the "socialist revolution" carried out against the working class, or without its support and or even without its existence, as let us say in China or Cuba, or in Egypt or Ghana or Zanzibar.

Yet Deutscher treats the entire question of the basic and fatal flaw in Trotsky's fight against Stalinism only in a few passing words, briefly, incidentally, almost like a bagatelle. This is less puzzling than it may seem.

Deutscher creates the impression that the events in Russia and elsewhere are not so much a case of Trotsky having misjudged the nature of Stalinism as it is of the Stalinists having misjudged, you might say, the nature of Trotskyism. It is not that Deutscher is a Stalinist. He is too "civilized," too much the gentleman-socialist, for that. He knows the iniquities and monstrosities of Stalinism as well as the next man, or better. But facts are facts and it is better to be objective than not. And the fact, the big historical and decisive fact is that although Stalin denounced Trotsky as a counterrevolutionist and a Fascist agent, it was after all Trotsky's program he carried out, at home and abroad. Indeed, "Stalin acted as the unwitting agent of permanent revolution within the Soviet Union" (Deutscher *dixit)*; and outside of it as well. The agent was bureaucratic, despotic, Asiatic, bloodthirsty, but he was the agent. And come to think of it, was the despotism *all* bad? Stalin, we now know, murdered more Communists than were killed by the bourgeois reaction in all of Europe, Hitler included, between the end of the First World War and the end of the Second. Among other things this is what his purges meant literally: and Deutscher is appalled by their horror. Yet—facts are still facts—"it was one of the effects of the purges that they prevented the managerial groups from consolidating as a social stratum." So, during the universalized massacre in Russia, Stalin saved it from . . . capitalism! Deutscher must have an irrepressible strain of cheerfulness in him. Some people find a silver lining in every cloud. Deutscher can find one even in the hecatombs of Stalin.

He suffers, and in a highly aggravated and perverted form, from the effects of the same dogma, a quarter century later, that Trotsky was on the verge of reconsidering a year before his death. In the twenties Trotsky saw the bureaucracy moving away from the socialist direction; *therefore* it was moving toward capitalism. As the Latin scholars say: *Tertium non datur.* In his own time, Deutscher saw the bureaucracy moving away from the

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capitalist direction; *therefore* it was moving toward socialism. *Tertium non datur.* Therefore Stalin was "the unwilling agent" of Trotsky's permanent revolution. Therefore Deutscher has been proclaiming "Trotsky's victory in defeat," because Stalin's successors have to and will liquidate the evil of Stalin's heritage and restore the spirit of democracy and internationalism incarnate in Trotsky. This assurance may be taken seriously in Washington or London. After ten years of these assurances by Deutscher, the bureaucracy has indeed made great strides toward democratism: Molotov and friends have not been shot, but only expelled from the party without anyone hearing their side or *knowing* where they stand; a prominent poet has been criticized but not shot, even though he attacked anti-Semitism in Russia; Khrushchev has not been shot, even though he openly attacks Mao.

Deutscher is no Stalinist. Indeed, he proclaims himself to be a Marxist on every possible occasion, so that none is left for him to explain what that means to him. The idea that socialism is and can only be the product of the political activity of a self-controlled and democratically organized working class is, it would seem, the heart and soul of Marxism. It may be true, it may be false, it may be valid or obsolete. But without it Marxism is literally meaningless. It is this idea that Deutcher seems to have in mind when he refers, somewhat airily, to "Classical Marxism." But Deutscher knows from experience and study that the idea is unrealistic and unrealizable. In its place he has put forth his own law that applies to all revolutions: The enthusiastic mass is led into a revolution but the subsequent hardships bring a loss of faith; the idealistic but naive-utopian prophets of the revolution cannot sustain the faith by persuasion; so the revolutionary despot replaces them and makes the mass have faith against its silly will; thus the revolution is saved by the despots, without the erratic mass and against it. Trotsky (the "Classical Marxist") was the utopian. The Marxism of Stalin, despotic savior of the revolution, was not so classical. Neither is Deutscher's. His modest fame as an apologist of Stalinism is well deserved. It vitiates his judgment of Trotsky. If the errors in Trotsky's fight against Stalinism were twice as grave as they now seem to me, it nevertheless remained a brave, unflagging fight against an infamy that disgraced the name of socialism, a fight that was at all times infused with the spirit of solidarity with the oppressed against the oppressor, that looked for an end of the tyranny not from the tyrant but from the conscious action of his victims. In his biographer you do not feel that spirit or see that fight.

MAX SHACHTMAN

Coming in the Fall Dissent:

The Third Dimension of Georg Lukacs

by Harold Rosenberg

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CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE, by Charles E. Silberman. Random House. 1964. 370 pp. $5.95.

"If whites were to stop all discriminatory practices tomorrow, this alone would not solve 'the Negro problem.' To be sure, an end to discrimination is a prerequisite to any solution. But too many Negroes are unable or unwilling to compete; segregation is an affliction, but for many it is a crutch as well."

True enough. And Silberman's fascinating and often sensible analysis of the way in which the Negro's social neurosis keeps him from entering American middle-class society makes this an important work. Unfortunately, the author—an editor of *Fortune*—fails to question whether the goal of economic and social "respectability" is worth it.

Silberman asks why, after all these years, the Negroes haven't "made it" as myriads of immigrants have done? The Negro community, he observes, is characterized by an inordinately high rate of crime, addiction, illegitimacy and broken homes. Remarkably few Negroes have tried to pull themselves up out of the slum by establishing their own businesses or their own self-help organizations. Insead they have apathetically accepted the conditions imposed by "the man." This, Silberman writes, constitutes the Negroes' "Negro problem."

The apathy acts as a screen for the Negroes hatred of himself, a hatred inculcated by white society which instructs him from the moment of birth that he is inferior. The Negro, Silberman argues, who straightens his hair and bleaches his skin, does not know his own identity, his own worth. He is as invisible to himself as he is to others. Nobody can know his name, for he does not know his own name.

Silberman draws a telling parallel between the "perverted paternalism" of Southern society and that of the concentration camp. The Nazis, he comments, systematically destroyed the inmates' sense of identity, with the result that many acted like fawning children rather than like adults. Similarly, the Negro man denied the rights of the marriage bed by the slave system, lost all sense of family responsibility. The matriarchy this set up continued after Emancipation for a variety of reasons, mainly that the Negro woman could always find work as a maid. The Negro man, kept "in his place" like a child, acted like a child—expecting "his white folks" to care for him down South and the white liberals to finance his social revolution up North.

The Black Muslims, Silberman claims, are the only Negro group squarely to face the double question of race pride and race responsibility. They have labeled the white man "devil" and the black man "divine." Yet, ironically these WASP-haters have become the very model of the Protestant ethic; they're as thrifty, self-reliant, hard working and puri-

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tanical as Ben Franklin could wish. Most important, they have undercut the matriarchy by preaching male supremacy and relegating the woman to the home.

Silberman correctly argues that the only solution is for the Negro *himself* to take political and economic power by militant tactics. The white liberal, he warns, must give what aid he can and then gracefully retire from the scene, as he reports Saul Alinsky did in the Woodlawn neighborhood of Chicago.

Unfortunately, Silberman becomes trapped in racist rhetoric when he attacks the white liberals for backing integration "in someone else's trade union and in someone else's school district." It is true that the Negro-liberal coalition has broken down on the two issues of jobs and education. But on the first, Silberman's own solution is morally and factually wrong; and, on the second, he himself lines up with a de facto segregationist position.

"Granting more jobs to Negroes may mean fewer jobs for whites, particularly if unemployment remains high," Silberman coolly comments in the midst of an otherwise useful discussion of the problem. This callous remark ignores the fact that the white man also needs money and status for self-respect. While I'm sure Silberman would welcome a Negro as a fellow *Fortune* editor, I'm equally certain that he'd howl like a trade unionist if that Negro was given his job or was given preferential treatment for advancement.

The solution probably involves a more drastic change in American attitudes than Silberman, with his easy dismissal of the automation problem and his peculiar confidence in our "booming" economy, is willing to envisage. One suspects that the proponents of the Triple Revolution, who advocate a massive public-works program plus a guaranteed income for all, may be closer to the heart of the problem.

On education, Silberman is for "integration later" and "separate but better" now. His point, and it is rather well taken, is that nobody will gain if a Negro child scoring scholastically two years behind the national average is bussed to a Queens school where the kids test two years above the national average. The Negro will simply feel more inferior, the white more superior and somebody will get beaten up after school. The answer, he suggests, is to beef up the Negro schools along the lines suggested by Kenneth Clark in the "Haryou" proposal. Given the current middle-class hysteria about getting into the "right" college, this is probably the only politically feasible answer.

A more radical solution, however, would be to put the kids together, but in small classes with experienced teachers. Doing this would involve giving up the educational status race for a while in favor of a different and potentially far more valuable form of education. The slum Negro and the suburban white kid could probably learn more from each other about how the world goes round, than either could from an IBM test.

Silberman's desire to turn the Negro child into a white child with a black skin (and why not some of the reverse?) is the key to what's wrong

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with this otherwise excellent book. For behind it lies the snobbish assumption that "white is right," despite the mass of evidence to the contrary. Although heroin addiction is not a practical solution to the Negro's "identity problem," neither is adopting the character structure of a society that drives one out of every ten of its members to the booby hatch.

SUSAN GOODMAN

Sadness in Appalachia

NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLAND: A BIOGRAPHY OF A DEPRESSED AREA, by Harry C. Caudill, with a foreword by Stewart Udall. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1963. 394 pp., $6.75.

The mountain ballad is a sad song. Harry Caudill's book has the tone of the ballad, the sound of the saga. The land of his story, the Southern mountains, is an American folk-land. There is no old-world atmosphere of warmth and community; men in the Cumberlands are not the natural men of romantic myth. The world of the mountains is a world of savage individualism among men who struggle for a livelihood and where the primary foe is man. Indeed, that struggle and the violence which attends it is one of the few breaks in the monotony and despair of life. In the Southern plateaus lonely men find a constant companion only in death, hear no words of approbation and no message of hope.

The Cumberland people are the passive men, those whose lives have been shaped by the juggernaut of modern industrialism. The world in which they have been forced to live is not one they can resist. Moreover, it is not one they can understand, let alone control. The railroads came, and after them came coal and timber exploitation, new wants and new ways. With bewildering rapidity, the industries gutted the land and went into a decline which could be survived only by automation on one hand, and ever more ruthless methods on the other. Both have led to growing unemployment and poverty in a region which comes more and more to resemble a scar on the land.

The men across the border in West Virginia have a motto: *Montani Semper Liberi,* mountaineers are always freemen. The words are full of pathos because they contain a hollow truth: the men of the Cumberlands have a freedom, the freedom of isolation and weakness. When they have been loyal, they have been betrayed, and when they fought—as they often have—they have been beaten. The businessmen were trusted in the beginning, and eventually deserted the region (first, of course, "freeing" the company towns by selling the houses to the miners they were soon to leave without em-

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ployment). The government gave a favored status to the companies on the tax rolls, but left the area without adequate public works or schools. The United Mine Workers was, for a time, a champion of the land, but confronted with a crisis of its own, the UMW too has deserted the region.

The New Deal brought help in the form of welfare. But welfare has proved to be a permanent, not a temporary, fact of life. It has become a dole, based on no sense of worth or contribution, accentuating the mountaineer's sense of weakness, depriving him of any sense of dignity. That, in itself, teaches us something: that man has a need for a soul as well as for sustenance, that even abundance in the Cumberlands would be no substitute for dignity.

In Caudill's book there are no human villains. Men act from comprehensible and even decent motives. The rapacious operator of the small "truck mine" is trying to keep his head above water. The UMW leaders are trying to save their union. The great "rail mines" are striving to save a dying industry by automation. The villain, in Caudill's eyes, would seem to be coal itself. But the villain of the saga is more than coal. It is an industrial and social system which allows itself to be guided by the aim of "efficient production," and in which men are molded to fit the patterns of a process and then cast aside when the patterns change.

Caudill's book is part of the great tradition of American Populism. The modern age, he affirms, has produced a crisis of democracy. The hyper-democratic constitution of Kentucky builds local governments which are at best obstructions. The federal government is far away, its enforcement of existing laws largely perfunctory. The experts seem to be obstructed by the people, who do not understand the crisis, and the people are dehumanized by the experts, who do not understand man. All this Caudill knows, but his proposals are not always happy ones. His suggestion of a Southern Mountain Authority is a good one, undoubtedly a progressive step. But Caudill has already suggested that TVA, once set up to fight the industrial juggernaut, has become part of it by supporting destructive "strip mining" in order to gain cheap coal. The agencies become expert, and having become expert, became the servants of the monster.

Traditionally, the gap between man and the system, the people and the experts, was to be bridged by politics. Caudill, himself a politician, is aware that something has gone wrong with politics among a people who no longer care. Until that crisis is resolved, Caudill's Mountain Authority runs the danger of being a new juggernaut with a kindlier aim. Mountaineers, like the rest of us, can be truly freemen only in a truly free society. That truth alone makes *Night Comes to the Cumberland* worth reading for any man who still would be free.

W. Carey McWilliams

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THE HAUNTED FIFTIES, by I. F. Stone. Random House. 1963. $5.95.

Events enter the world, Karl Kraus used to say, as journalistic cliches. Surely the dead hand of the word is not to be doubted in our day: these cliches set the limits of all but our most quixotic politics, and it is on their behalf that young men are sent off to die. Is this a new phenomenon, or even a fresh insight? Was it, a half century ago, when the satirist of Vienna first noticed "the connection between the maltreatment of words and the maltreatment of souls and bodies?" Perhaps not; but I think it something other than an illusion to say that the malaise is now worse, more widely diffused, and its costs greater.

It is for that reason and by contrast with so many of his colleagues—left and right, east and west—that I. F. Stone merits our esteem. I know of no one in American journalism, at least, whose writing is less marred by dangerous cant than is his. Predictably he is not distributed by a national syndicate and no metropolitan paper has seen fit to avail itself of his talents. Since shortly after the demise in 1952 of New York's *Daily Compass,* the second of the ill-fated lineal descendants of *PM,* he has been an altogether independent newspaperman, his own editor and publisher, appearing in a *Weekly* identified by his name. To the not inconsiderable number of his readers—his enterprise is a financial success! —that patrimony has come to mean a distinctive brand of honest and thorough reporting and penetrating comment, and these in a decade when the craft was dishonored more than even its fiercest critics are willing to believe.

This book is not without the weaknesses one normally attributes to anthologies of this sort. More was included than might strictly have been required and some of the pieces were so much of the immediate moment that they hardly commend themselves even as historical curiosity. And there are syntactical and stylistic infelicities which one can explain only by their having been put to paper under pressure of a deadline. But these strictures are limited. Mr. Stone's style is generally lucid and crisp, and often it ascends to both elegance and eloquence.

This is not a volume from the pen of one who moves easily among the mighty. In fact, one might say that it is a record of footnotes to the fifties, to that part of the era which the keepers of the conventional wisdom have self-protectively and almost systematically exorcised from memory. Stone's perspective is that of lonely dissent; his heroes are society's victims, of the like of Emmett Till, Owen Lattimore and Boris Pasternak; and his beliefs are so authentically American that they do not bear facile comparison to the radical creeds of Europe. But he is a radical with an old-fashioned faith, one we so glibly disdain, in the capacity of men to cre-

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ate the conditions of the good life. Which is not to say that in clinging to the idea of progress, albeit that progress meaning something more modest than the grandiloquent promise the word once conveyed, he has made a mystique of revolution or of the revolutions of our time. He has not permitted his pages to serve as an intellectual pastorate for oppression.

This book testifies to Stone's fidelity to what John Strachey once called "the great hope." Others of like conviction blinded themselves to radical evil done in pursuit of the good, while yet others volte-faced into the hysterics and comforts of the newly deconverted. Those associated with this magazine know better than I, whose maturity post-dates Stalin's death and McCarthy's, how difficult was that stance of critical autonomy. Some, I am certain, will refuse to recognize in Stone a person who shared their fate. I think they misread him or wanted to. Read now of his visit to Moscow and his inflamed passions as the Red Army tanked through the streets of Budapest. I have lapsed into a defensive posture out of a possibly erroneous anticipation of reader response. I want, in truth, to say this more belligerently: his journals from Havana, for example, far from uncritical but judicious and more complicated than is the view of the "futilitarians of the left," constitute the most persuasive argument I have read anywhere for sympathy with Castro's revolution.

A goodly portion of this volume deals with the deterioration of the international situation and the intensification of the arms race. Here, there is something at once poignant and historically detached in his evolving description of our descent into national frustration. The intermittent portrait he paints, in this context, of John Foster Dulles is simply masterful, a devastating demolition job. And Eisenhower emerges as sheer pathos itself, betrayed by his innocence and his friends. But the spectre which haunts the fifties is that of the strenuous ordeal of freedom. That history warrants rereading, both as regards the state of our liberty today and the rights of our fellow citizens tomorrow. Particularly in these terms is there no question but that those old articles, dated five or ten years ago, are still relevant.

I wouldn't think he has ever been summoned for a private briefing, but it is precisely because Stone can percive the hole in an official story and has a healthy and unusually rare distrust of the government press release that he has been of such immense help to students and scholars simply as a source of news. He cares also, however, about values and the purposes of politics, which is why he is able to place the individual incident significantly in the general frame of events. He is not a pundit or prophet embarrassed by contradiction, and he has the winning habit of dealing explicitly with an altered judgment.

There are risks such unusual men face, especially in journalism. He is too hard-headed to covet the legend of Orwell's goodness, and he has graciously preserved us from the moralizing and self-righteous feuilletons of Murray Kempton or Dwight Macdonald, to name but a few who have worked his vineyard. He has written the truth as he saw it. Reason enough to be grateful.

MARTIN PERETZ

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